思維領導

Regulators have increasingly mandated firms to promptly disclose material cybersecurity incidents upon discovering these incidents. We find suggestive evidence indicating that some firms manipulate the discovery date (“misreport”) of a cybersecurity incident to postpone the disclosure of the incident, as evidenced by a pronounced spike in insider sales before the reported discovery date. We also find that misreporting is more prevalent among firms with weak internal control systems, when firms face low litigation risk, and when firms have greater pressure to meet a disclosure deadline. Further, firms suspected of misreporting tend to disclose their remedial actions and assert the restoration of business, mitigating negative market reactions upon disclosure of incidents. Collectively, our results suggest that firms might strategically misreport information about a cybersecurity incident to delay disclosure to gain additional time for remedial actions, which helps them prevent exposing vulnerabilities to malicious actors and alleviate stakeholder anxiety.

Blockchain technologies have catalyzed the rise of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), which operate in an incentive network fueled by crypto tokens. In essence, these tokens are imbued with either payment rights (i.e., transactional tokens) or ownership rights (i.e., governance tokens). The decentralized organizational paradigm dismantles the traditional management structure and bring new research opportunities to Operations Management (OM). While the performance of DAOs has been largely examined in current OM literature, the effectiveness of their internal incentive mechanisms—specifically the one that uses ownership as rewards to promote user contributions—remains unclear. Focusing on DAO-enabled virtual communities, we seek to examine whether decentralized ownership provides stronger incentives for user behaviors, such as creation and curation, in comparison to traditional monetary rewards through the lens of psychological ownership theory. We obtained data from Steemit that captures the reward, creation, curation and transaction behaviors of 98,000 users from May 2017 to April 2019. By leveraging the “power-up” action as a shock that increases user ownership shares, we established a quasi-experimental setting. Employing the PSM-DID model, we found that the use of governance tokens is associated with enhanced creation and curation efforts but declined creation novelty, compared to the use of transactional tokens. Our additional analyses further reveal that the incentive effects of governance tokens diminish over time. However, upon the recurrence of the intended choice, these effects become reinforced. Notably, we find that governance token ownership is more strongly associated with curation efforts for users with weaker social ties. Conversely, for users with high reputation scores, their content creation behaviors are less strongly associated with governance token ownership. This study contributes to the burgeoning discourse on blockchain and cryptocurrency from an operational perspective, providing valuable insights for the design of incentive mechanisms in DAOs and advancing our understanding of operational efficiencies and stakeholder engagement in decentralized structures within Operations Management.

In the burgeoning marketplaces of digital assets, non-fungible tokens (NFTs) revolutionize digital asset ownership and intellectual property (IP) protection, but high minting costs create barriers to marketplace entry and growth. This study examines the impact of “lazy minting,” a new NFT production method introduced by major NFT marketplaces to lower minting costs by deferring blockchain certification until the first sale. In response to the call for further research on emerging technologies in operations management, we explore how this policy affects the net sales performance of existing sellers in the NFT marketplaces. Based on transaction cost economics (TCE) and the literature about different IP protection methods, we distinguish between lazy- and regular-minted NFTs by their differential transaction costs and utilize the staggered difference-in-differences (DID) method to conduct our analysis. We find that lazy minting adoption significantly boosts the net sales performance of existing sellers. This is attributed to their cost-adaptive IP protection behavior. Specifically, they achieve this by minting more NFTs with a larger proportion of style-consistent NFTs through lazy minting, while strategically employing regular minting for style-breaking NFTs, which is contingent upon their reputation. Our study has important theoretical and practical implications for operations management under the emerging technological revolution.