芯片裡的梵高：人工智能如何重塑創作邏輯和藝術市場

藝術與AI矛盾背後的行業存亡思辨

近年來，人工智能（AI）技術的爆發式發展，在世界各地掀起了激烈討論與深層焦慮，究竟人工智能會否替代人類工作，並且摧毀各行各業。早在 2016 年，英國物理學家霍金生前就有此預言：隨着人工智能崛起，中產階級勢將深受就業流失趨勢的影響，只有最講求關愛、創造力和監督力的崗位得以保留。【註1】

在這場席捲全球的技術革新浪潮中，藝術行業因其對創意與審美的極高要求，往往被視為人類獨特性的最後壁壘。香港特區政府非常重視文藝創意產業，全力推動此一生態圈的繁榮，2023年用於培育新進藝術人才和資助藝團發展的撥款接近1億元。與此同時，現實的矛盾卻正在凸顯；已有報導指出，一些藝術從業員抱怨工作機會正被人工智能悄然擠佔。

為明晰討論邊界，筆者將借助人工智能繪圖工具創作的藝術作品定義為「人工智能藝術」，而將通過傳統繪畫工具獨立完成的原創作品稱作「原生人類藝術」。當下，一邊是 「原生人類藝術不可替代」 的堅定信念，一邊是「人工智能藝術正在崛起」 的現實衝擊，這種認知衝突直指核心命題：人工智能究竟會如何重塑藝術家的創作邏輯？當人工智能深度介入有關領域，原生人類藝術作品的市場價值是否會被人工智能藝術吞噬殆盡？

美學、創意、聲譽的三方博弈

在探討人工智能對藝術行業的影響前，應先破解評估藝術作品價值的「密碼」。 這個看似充滿感性色彩的一環，實則暗藏一套微妙的理性邏輯。經典的享樂主義定價理論揭示了藝術品價值的本質——價值來自其美學和創造力水平。鑑賞一件藝術品時，其中蘊含的美學特質與創新因子，恰似一顆投入湖面的石子，會在觀賞者心中激發美學享受、好奇心滿足以及情感共鳴。【註2】

然而，觀賞者對藝術品美學與創造力水平的評價，每每具有強烈主觀性，難以形成統一標準，此時公眾普遍認可的創作者聲譽，便成為衡量藝術品價值的關鍵標尺。即便無法與畢卡索的抽象藝術產生情感共振的觀者，也不會否定其作品的藝術價值。藝術家在行業內的地位與影響力，為作品價值提供了共識錨點。

綜合而言，藝術品的美學水平、創造力水平與藝術家聲譽，共同構成了決定其市場價值的核心要素。在此基礎上，人工智能技術將如何從這3個維度介入藝術創作過程？對原生人類藝術品的價值呈現，又會產生什麼影響？

AI是助力還是挑戰

人工智能與藝術創作的關係正引發行業思辨。支持者認為，人工智能繪圖工具能根據使用者的指令，整合不同藝術流派的技法與概念，為創作提供多元靈感。美國紐約大學相關研究顯示，與人工智能工具互動後，藝術創作者的思路因受到顯著啟發而開闊得多，部分創作者從中獲得突破固有風格的新視角，提升自身的美學素養和創造力水平。【註3】

此外，「人工智能藝術家」標籤正成為行業先鋒符號。隨着人工智能技術熱度攀升，嘗試以人工智能輔助創作的藝術家更易引發公眾與媒體關注。這種曝光效應將可能為其帶來提升個人聲譽的契機，因而在藝術生態圈中更易形成差異化影響力。

反對者對此則有所擔憂。加拿大多倫多大學一項研究指出，長期依賴 AI 工具可能導致使用者個人創意降低，思維趨向同質化。【註4】如此看來，過度依賴人工智能或對藝術創作者的個人能力產生負面效果。版權與道德問題也隨之凸顯，據報道，多名著名藝術家共同起訴 AI 繪圖工具供應商，指控其濫用有關作品作 AI 訓練用途、侵害版權，以致應用 AI 繪圖工具的創作者亦面臨聲譽受損的風險。

目前，應用人工智能對藝術家美學素養、創造力水平和行業聲譽的具體影響尚無定論，相關爭議仍有待通過實證數據加以探究。

AI輔助創作的價值增長曲線

數字藝術品交易平台近年不斷發展，藝術創作者可在這些平台上透過電子檔案形式，出售各類畫作以供顧客下載，並在社區內與潛在顧客互動。某領先平台要求作者披露作品是否以 AI技術繪製，這種規則既清晰區分了「人工智能藝術」與「原生人類藝術」的界線，也使研究者得以追踪分析兩類作品的市場表現。

筆者的研究團隊針對某領先數字藝術品交易平台，對3355位藝術家的 415906件繪畫作品數據及其交易記錄，展開了全面且系統性的分析。研究樣本聚焦於原生人類藝術作品，由創作者獨立繪製，充分展現出其內在藝術能力與創新能力。研究過程中運用了多領域先進演算法：採用機器視覺領域的BAID演算法衡量其原生人類畫作審美價值;借助 Meta AI Lab 的 Dino V2演算法抽取圖像特徵，並結合滾動餘弦距離演算法，以評估藝術家在其原生人類藝術作品中表現的創新能力; 同時以粉絲授予的勳章數量，反映藝術家聲譽的變化。

研究結果顯示，嘗試運用人工智能技術的藝術創作者，其美學素養、創造力水平及個人聲譽均呈現向上態勢：在與人工智能繪圖工具互動後，作者後續發布的原生人類藝術品在美學、創意維度評分顯著提高，且在價格、銷量及利潤方面均實現增長。這一研究成果支持了一個積極的假設：人工智能技術很有可能並沒有擠壓傳統藝術市場，反而通過賦能創作者，有效拓寬了原生人類藝術品的價值空間。

AI技術賦能的未來圖景

我們的研究結果顯示，人工智能大概並非原生人類藝術品行業的終結者，相反，它有可能正扮演着賦能者的角色，為積極接納它的藝術創作者開啟全新機遇之門。長遠而言，若能合理運用人工智能工具，從中汲取靈感與技巧，有望成為藝術創作者保持競爭力的關鍵。

著眼於人工智能技術的巨大潛力，立足亞洲藝術與技術革新前沿，香港特區政府正積極投資，布局人工智能在創意產業的發展，同時構建風險防控體系。 香港生成式人工智能研發中心已推出 HKGAI V1 系列人工智能工具，具備文本、圖像、音頻、視頻的多媒體綜合生成能力，為業界提供強大的創作輔助。再者，數字政策辦公室也公布了《香港生成式人工智能技術及應用指引》，聚焦版權、道德等關鍵問題，為人工智能創意產業的穩健發展築牢合規根基。

展望未來，文化藝術產業將步入人類創造力與人工智能深度融合的嶄新時代。在技術與藝術的碰撞交融中，藝術的邊界將不斷拓展，新的美學範式與創作形態有望持續湧現，相信可為全球文藝愛好者帶來更多驚喜與感動。

註1：https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/01/stephen-hawking-dangerous-time-planet-inequality

註2：Hernando, E., & Campo, S. (2017). “Does the Artist’s Name Influence the Perceived Value of an Art Work?” International Journal of Arts Management 19(2): 46–58.

註3：https://www.sps.nyu.edu/homepage/emerging-technologies-collaborative/blog/2023/embracing-creativity-how-ai-can-enhance-the-creative-process.html

註4：https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2410.03703

方鈺麟教授
港大經管學院創新及資訊管理學教授，數字經濟與創新研究所總監

牟洋忱
香港大學數字經濟與創新研究所研究助理

錢冰潔博士
香港大學數字經濟與創新研究所博士后、同濟大學經管學院助理教授

（本文同時於二零二五年六月十一日載於《信報》「龍虎山下」專欄）

內地電商強攻下香港零售業如何自救

近期內地電商巨頭淘寶、京東、拼多多紛紛發力，將香港市場納入包郵區。過去港人需先通過中轉集運才能接收所訂貨品，相比之下，最新推出的一站式購物服務，自然大受歡迎。

無庸置疑，內地電商龍頭的搶灘行為必會影響本地零售業，讓早已低迷的銷情雪上加霜。這種趨勢下，本土零售業有什麼應對之道？筆者從以下3個角度建議業界如何破解困局。

善用數據優化零售營銷

按照一般看法，內地電商的核心競爭力在於價格低廉，筆者卻認為，此等企業在數字化方面，同樣遙遙領先香港零售業。內地零售業極其重視數據分析，往往設有龐大的數據分析部門，通過統計學、經濟學、機器學習等方法，研究如何更好地為消費者進行定價、產品推薦和提升服務。以淘寶為例，「順手買一件」功能就是基於用戶的選購商品和瀏覽內容等行為，判斷用戶還可能喜歡買哪種產品而作出推薦，力求提升其購買意欲。

除了電商之外，內地的線下零售業也在積極進行數字化轉型。筆者曾經與內地菜市場（類似香港街市）合作，通過用戶的購物數據和地理軌跡優化市場布局、產品選擇，以及對用戶展開更為個性化的促銷。這些數字化改變可以在成本不額外增加的前提下，大大提升零售效益。

反觀本港零售業在這方面卻不盡如人意。很多本地零售品牌不懂數字化，也無意採用，一直依循傳統的營銷思維看待零售業，甚至沒有收集用戶數據。即使認識到數字化的重要性，企業對數據的運用也往往淺嘗輒止。例如，一些知名品牌也投入巨資建立網購平台，可惜卻沒有分析平台積累的寶貴用戶數據。另外，一些線下零售商推行積分系統，給予用戶購物獎勵，但也沒有積極發掘交易數據的價值，這是對數字資源的巨大浪費。本地零售商若不能徹底適應數字化，擁抱數字化，就難望在智能時代保持競爭力。

差異化定位減輕競爭壓力

經濟學的一個基本原理，就是差異化定位可以減低競爭，讓企業獲得相對優勢。受制於高工資和租金，香港的零售業普遍成本較高，如果直接和內地電商打價格戰，根本毫無勝算。在這種情況下，本地零售商不妨考慮放棄或減少沒有競爭力的產品，而聚焦於旗下更有優勢或內地電商難以覆蓋的產品。眾所周知，香港是自由港，絕大多數產品沒有內地增值稅和消費稅，但舖租和員工成本較高，因此對大部分產品而言，並無價格優勢；相反，對少量單價高的貴重產品則仍有價格優勢，如大牌奢侈品、黃金飾品、電子產品、化妝品等。

此外，一些富本地特色的產品，如藥油藥膏、本土文創、餅乾點心等商品，也是內地無法提供的，因而具有天然競爭力。香港零售商應該多開發和選擇具有獨特競爭力的產品，與國內電商錯位競爭，以保自身競爭優勢。就拿天天吃到的大米來說，如果本地零售商銷售內地大米，肯定難以在價格方面佔優，但改為銷售泰國、日本出產的大米，而面向不同消費群組的錯位競爭，就可藉自由港的免稅優勢保證收益。

加強政府監管以鞏固品質信心

相信不少市民對十多年前內地奶粉大軍的情況依然記憶猶新。受2008年三鹿奶粉醜聞影響，內地人對國產奶粉品牌喪失信心，紛紛前往香港搶購奶粉，以致本地奶粉庫存告急，這也推動特區政府在2013年修改法例，限制奶粉出境。又如內地奶粉品牌晨光乳業旗下「供港一號牛奶」，通過標籤中「供港」字眼，打造符合香港質檢標準的形象。至於去年國內油罐車裝載食用油事件，甚至促使民眾專程南下，購買香港食用油。這些例子在在反映內地人對香港產品質量的信心，更顯示高標準的品質可以成為香港零售業的優勢。

不可不察的是，近年來本港屢有冒牌產品和假貨出現，蠶食市民大眾對香港產品的信心。例如，街市銷售丹麥藍罐曲奇假貨、代購平台賣假手袋時有發生，甚至出現冒牌藥物和中成藥。若這些假貨不受管制而得以流入市場，勢必影響香港的品質聲譽。此外，2024年7月亦曾引起「農夫山泉」風波：香港消費者委員會（消委會）檢測市面各款樽裝水，指出農夫山泉品質達到歐盟標準上限，卻遭農夫山泉發律師信；結果消委會將該樣本改列為獨立類別，經重新評分後整體表現由4.5星上調至5星。

上述事件無疑會消耗市民的信任，一旦香港產品的品質優勢不再，被打上低端劣質的標籤，其競爭力勢將蕩然無存。因此，特區政府務須訂立嚴謹的品質標準，並加強執法打擊假貨，維護產品的品質優勢，加上零售業配合宣傳，即可讓市民安心選購香港產品。

追上數字化時代的步伐，善用差異化策略，強化品質信心，都是可行策略。如能三管齊下，就有望維持香港零售業的持續優勢。

李曦教授
港大經管學院市場學教授、亞洲案例研究中心總監、數字經濟與創新研究所副總監

（本文同時於二零二五年六月四日載於《信報》「龍虎山下」專欄）

香港旅遊IP可向泡泡瑪特取經

今年首季錄得1220萬名旅客訪港，創新冠疫情後的季度新高；內地五一黃金周則迎來110萬名旅客，按年增加22%。誠然，數字增長並不代表萬事大吉。隨着全球經濟放緩、消費降級，很多遊客當天來當天走，甚至「發明」了在快餐店過夜的省錢旅遊攻略。

旺丁不旺財，可能導致城市資源無法承擔遊客增多所產生的負荷，而市民則不滿遊客帶來的擁擠和不便，最終只會影響旅遊業的持續發展。

如何旺丁又旺財呢？筆者上月就曾在本欄撰文分析泡泡瑪特的知識產權策略（IP strategy）【註1】；既然這家潮流文化娛樂公司的商品IP可以聲譽和銷量雙贏，香港的旅遊IP是否可以從中借鏡呢？

人無我有 只此一家

泡泡瑪特和藝術家簽署獨家授權，亦即只有泡泡瑪特有權使用Labubu等眾多IP形象。反觀香港的旅遊IP，則不用和誰簽署協議，就已是自身的寶貴資產。無論是綿延298公里的四大行山徑，還是荷里活電影《變形金剛》的取景點鰂魚涌「怪獸大廈」；無論是穿行北角春秧街菜市場的「叮叮」電車，還是屹立百年的哥德式建築伯大尼教堂，甚至是堅尼地城海旁一隅的日常景觀，無一不是香港獨一無二的風景。

擁有當然只是第一步，如何得以眾所周知，則有賴行之有效的宣傳。Labubu風靡東南亞的背後是泡泡瑪特的營銷策略。潮玩很多，但能掛在Blackpink泰國女星Lisa的手袋上，能和泰國公主合照，能成為泰國官方首位IP旅遊大使，則只有Labubu。哪管在民間或官方層面，泡泡瑪特都給Labubu充足的曝光機會，才使得Labubu在泰國一鳴驚人。

香港多元的旅遊資源也需要通過類似的曝光，才能廣為人知。從頂流明星，到影響力強的KOL，以至官方宣傳，只有打造出鮮明地標，令國際形象深入人心，才算得上「修成正果」。

人有我優 精益求精

即便是與別不同的景致，也不是沒有競爭對手。有山有海的行山徑深圳也有，哥德式教堂廣州、上海、青島亦可見，為什麼遊客要選擇來香港呢？正如泡泡瑪特既不是盲盒的發明者，也不是盲盒市場的壟斷商，何以消費者對其產品情有獨鍾？

一個看似簡單的盲盒，除了藏在裡面設計精良的潮玩，還包含背後各種市場營銷巧思：要是定價太低，恐怕有損IP的品牌價值；定價太高，則難令消費者樂意解囊。售價介乎70至100元之間，即使中學生也可以省點零用錢就能買到。至於如何避免消費者重複抽到同一玩偶，泡泡瑪特樂見客戶互換盲盒之餘，還從互換盲盒的數據中推測下個爆款。這正是「人有我優」策略畫龍點睛之處，也是泡泡瑪特的致勝之道。

本港不妨借鑑這個經驗，除了「一無二」，更要「勝一籌」。例如，雖然香港故宮文化博物館的展品數量和質量不及北京國家博物館，但是香港故宮文化博物館的突出之處，在於展覽策劃、展品說明，甚至展館背景音樂。在國內舉辦的大型展覽，參觀者往往擠得水洩不通，相較之下，香港故宮文化博物館則可讓遊客慢慢欣賞、細細琢磨、悠悠品味。這種「人有我優」的細意安排，足以吸引曾經去過國家博物館的遊客步入香港故宮，欣賞妙不可言的賞玩藝術。

人優我全 包羅萬象

香港無疑是彈丸之地，然而麻雀雖小五臟俱全。論自然風景，既有唯一兩次獲選世界三大夜景的太平山頂，也有被美國媒體CNN譽為全球最美行山徑之一的龍脊。論市區風貌，既有中銀大廈、環球貿易廣場等摩天大樓，也有銅鑼灣鵝頸橋下打小人的舊式習俗。論飲食潮流，既有潮人雲集的蘭桂坊，也有歷史悠久的點心車茶居蓮香樓。

從市區到郊野，從摩登到傳統，從歷史到潮流，也都近在咫尺，讓訪客全面體驗繽紛多彩的旅遊驚喜。這種「小而全」，正是香港作為東西交匯、新舊互碰的優厚條件。

如何利用「人優我全」的優勢？特區政府不妨學習泡泡瑪特為Labubu不停推出的系列產品。同一個Labubu既可以在海邊散步，也可以做慵懶的瑜伽，每個系列都使Labubu變得百變有趣，買一個不如買一套，買一套不如逐套收藏。同理，香港豐富的旅遊資源可設計出萬花筒式主題，如「香港的夜與日」、「香港的中與西」、「香港的山城與海港」，「香港的繁忙與慢活」等系列。一個城市若能呈現出各式各樣的美好，遊客才會駐足細味，酒店以至相關行業自然不愁沒生意。

雖然旅遊業的附加值只佔本地生產總值的2.6%，卻是15萬名從業員的飯碗。遊客消費也為零售業總銷售額貢獻18%，為飲食業總收入貢獻24%【註】。這一行的興衰與每個香港人可謂息息相關。毫無疑問，旅遊業是一個城市的名片，象徵其軟實力。只有足夠發達的城市才有實力打造和宣傳蘊藏其中的旅遊資源；只有足夠成熟的社會才能照顧和關注遊客的需求；也只有足夠開放的文化才能包容八方的來客。

冀望香港真能做到無處不旅遊、無處不周全，令來去匆匆的遊客留連忘返。

註1：〈泡泡瑪特一夜爆紅的IP策略〉，范亭亭，《信報》，2025年4月16日

註2：《香港旅遊業發展藍圖2.0》（https://www.cstb.gov.hk/file_manager/tc/documents/consultation-and-publications/Tourism_Blueprint_2.0_Chinese.pdf）

范亭亭博士
港大經管學院市場學首席講師

（本文同時於二零二五年五月二十八日載於《信報》「龍虎山下」專欄）

貿易戰與宏觀經濟恆等式

早前中美雙方在日內瓦就關稅會談，出乎意料地迅速達成休戰共識，關稅稅率暫時回落至所謂美國「解放日」之前的水平，但全球局面却難復舊觀。美國總統特朗普玩弄所謂談判技巧，叫價忽高忽低、忽真忽假，威逼利誘，爲己方製造談判空間。可是礙于底氣不足，邏輯紊亂，貿易戰猶如美方蹩脚的馬戲班雜耍，將全球經濟政策不確定性指數推至歷史高點【注1】。

經過一個多月的折騰，特朗普的關稅神話已不攻自破。說關稅是由外國而非美國支付，却在沃爾瑪通知消費者貨品因關稅而加價時，責成沃爾瑪應「吞下」關稅，而非轉嫁給消費者。說關稅會重振美國製造業和創造工作崗位，却批評蘋果公司首席執行官庫克將iPhone生産轉到印度，而非帶回美國。

至于金融市場對關稅上升或暫緩的大幅度反應，更是不留情面的表達關稅大棒對經濟的負面影響。特朗普團隊只能改變口風，說關稅畢竟有些短期影響，長遠來說還是對美國利多于弊。

目前，除了與英國達成沒太多實質內容的協議外，美國和其他國家的貿易談判還沒任何成果。對等關稅90天寬限期將在7月9日結束，大抵各國都認識到美國外强中乾，想多看其他國家的情况來判斷美國的底綫，沒快快下跪，這使美國的處境愈來愈尷尬，因此特朗普和財政部長貝桑都分別在數天前表示，若各國沒談判誠意，美國便會單方面徵收「解放日」當天宣布的對等關稅稅率。這是美國慣性的威嚇伎倆，惟事情畢竟要解决，也許在未來數周會出現一些突破口。

進口遏本地生産屬錯誤理解

特朗普和他的團隊把關稅鬧得這麽大，賭上美國的經濟和國際形象，自然有他們的看法和執念，雖然不一定都正確，這裏以兩條宏觀經濟學入門的恒等式來討論。

美國上月底公布本年首季GDP數字，實質增長率與前一季相比，以按年下跌0.3%的速度减少，大部分美國輿論都認爲是美國企業爭取在特朗普政府提高關稅之前，大量進口外國商品所致。衆多的主流傳媒，包括《華爾街日報》、《華盛頓郵報》、彭博、消費者新聞與商業頻道等，均如此報道。背後的思路，是進口降低了本地生産。

按這個邏輯推理，中國多年來對美國的大量出口，便嚴重地拉低美國的生産和經濟增長，同時奪去美國工人的就業機會。特朗普兩次當選總統，其中一原因是成功地利用這種思維，標榜自己會以關稅抗拒外國産品，保護美國和美國工人的利益。他的貿易顧問納瓦羅，也多年來不斷重複類似言論。

然而，進口會减少本地生産，是錯誤的理解，因爲進口是「外國的生産」，進口多少，影響的是外國而非本地生産。這或許不能完全澄清所有疑慮，那看看本地生産總值，也就是所謂GDP。

宏觀經濟學入門教科書，通常都會在首一、二章解釋GDP的量度方法，幷以Y=C+I+G+EX-IM這個算式表達，其中Y是GDP，C是消費，I是實質投資，G是政府開支，EX是出口，IM是進口。一般讀者會誤以爲進口IM的前面有减號，便得出IM增加、Y相應减少的結論。但這條公式只是會計結果，即在産量已成定局時（如去年的GDP）要找出它的總值，較簡單的做法就是計算公式右邊各組成部分的總和而已。若要瞭解進口或貿易逆差和GDP的關係，還得要加入有關的經濟行爲假設和分析，不能簡單地從這公式看出來。

進口與投資消費會互相抵消

舉例來說，若美國企業因預期關稅上調而提早從外國入貨，不錯會增加IM，但這不是唯一的經濟活動。如果貨品進口後暫時存入貨倉，那在上述公式中，企業的庫存投資（也就是I的一部分）會和進口同時上升，互相抵消而不會改變Y。如果貨品即時售予消費者，那等于消費增加，公式中的C亦會和進口同時上升及互相抵消。

同樣地，如果貨品是由政府而非企業進口，那麽G也會相應提高。

換句話說，美國本年首季GDP輕微收縮，與美國爭取在關稅提高前增加進口無關，而是其他原因導致。同理，IM數值的改變，一般都有相應的C、I、或G的改變而不影響到本地生産。

如果進口是用來替代本地産品，若消費者减少購買本地産品，轉買外國産品，那本地生産自然下跌。不過，嚴格來說，進口行爲幷不直接减少本地生産，後者下跌只是因消費者爲某些原因先不購買本地産品。若果原因是外國産品價廉物美，本地貨品難以競爭，那减少沒有競爭力行業的本地生産，讓廣大消費者購買更便宜的進口貨，是適當的安排，說不定騰出來的資源可轉移到更有優勢的行業。此外，進口和本地生産不一定互相取代，也可能是互相補充，特別是進口的是零部件或原材料，在這情况下，進口愈多，本地生産也會愈高。

總而言之，進口多少或貿易逆差多大，和本地生産總值的關係有多個可能性，幷非進口愈多本地生産必然愈少。反過來說，以關稅或其他貿易壁壘來限制進口，不一定會帶動本地生産，甚至可能弄巧反拙。過去數年，美國的進口總值持續擴大，但美國的失業率都維持在接近4%的歷史低位（新冠肺炎期間除外），與進口會减少本地生産的說法不符。

逆差與外資流入無因果關係

另一條被特朗普團隊誤用的宏觀經濟恒等式，是經常賬逆差等于淨外資流入。經常賬的主要部分是貿易餘額，爲簡單起見這裏就不考慮其他較小的部分。外資流入就是外國資金爲本地所用，也等于外國貸款給本地。

這兩者之所以恒等，以美國爲例，美國的貿易逆差能够成爲事實，或美國人用外國産品可以多于外國人用美國産品，無論在個人或企業層面如何安排，歸根究柢是美國人多用的外國産品是外國暫時借給美國的。美國的貿易逆差愈大，等于向外國討債愈多、或外資流入愈多，兩者同時出現，是一個硬幣的兩邊。

即使美國發行美元來支付貿易逆差，也等于欠外國債務，因爲美元是美國聯儲局的負債，亦是外國美元持有者的資産，只不過美元現金這個資産的名義回報率是零，低于美元債券而已。

經常賬逆差等于資金流入量這個恒等式，同樣是會計結果，不代表任何因果關係，特朗普團隊却作如下的論述。

由于美元是最主要的外匯儲備貨幣，衆多的外國央行均在外匯市場買入美元，使美元相對其他貨幣升值，導致美國多進口少出口，形成長期龐大的貿易逆差、製造業萎縮、工人失業及依賴外國産品，同時外國則有貿易順差，將從美國賺到的美元轉換爲美國政府債券。當外國持有的美債愈來愈多，會威脅到美元作爲儲備貨幣的地位及美國的國家安全。

換句話說，外國資金流入美國持有美元美債，導致美國外貿逆差及製造業流失，似乎是說美國多年來爲全球提供外匯儲備貨幣，竟要承擔經濟上損失，特朗普爲使美國再次偉大，减少美國的「委屈」，便一方面對衆多貿易夥伴大幅加征關稅，以及萌生將現有美債轉換爲百年無息長債的想法等。

然而，上面的論述與實際情况幷不相符，首先是外國央行持有的美國政府債券，自2012年起至去年底都徘徊于4萬億美元左右，甚至有些下跌【注2】。

這反映總的來說，外國央行在這期間幷沒有加持美國政府債券作爲外匯儲備，惟美國的經常賬逆差仍在2020年後增加很多。

其次，若以製造業雇員占全國非農業雇員的比例來代表製造業占美國經濟重要性的話，這比例從二戰結束時的35%持續有序地下跌至目前的約8%【注3】。但期間美元匯價經歷了多次大幅波動，如在1985年廣場協議後美元的實質有效匯率從118大幅貶值至數年後的90，幷持續數年處于低位，可是沒有改變製造業雇員比例下跌的速度和趨勢。

也許政客的經濟論述只是影響輿論及爲政治服務，但特朗普2.0才開始了4個月，經濟政策的邏輯已顯得左支右絀。在去年總統競選時被選民認爲是特朗普强項的經濟政策，到最近路透的調查中只得37%受訪者認同。看來全球經濟政策不確定性指數在未來數年都會在高位波動。

注1：https://www.policyuncertainty.com/
注2：https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOGZ1FL263061130Q
注3：https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=cAYh

陸炎輝博士
港大經管學院榮譽副教授

（本文同時於二零二五年五月二十一日載於《信報》「龍虎山下」專欄）

Professor Joseph Chan

12 May 2025

Hong Kong has long recorded successful performance in its four pillar industries, comprising trading and logistics, financial services, professional and producer services, and tourism. According to research by the Hong Kong SAR Government, they contributed close to 60% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and almost half of the total employment before COVID 19. However, all four of these pillars have experienced a decline in their respective areas as a result of the rapid changes in market needs and user behaviour, regional and global competition, the development of new value chains, the impact of advanced technologies, and changes in the geopolitical environment. To address such challenges, “innovation” has been introduced to tackle these pain-points of Hong Kong. The question is how we should develop innovation strategies instead of coming up with ideas just for the sake of “innovation”. This article will discuss how innovation strategy can be approached from the perspective of poverty alleviation and how the Web3 industry may develop―both topics likely to shed light on how best to chart Hong Kong’s future course of development.

The Chief Executive announced in the 2022 Policy Address the restructuring of the Commission on Poverty to study targeted poverty alleviation for groups in need. In his 2024 Policy Address, the focus was on the following three areas: sub-divided flats, single-parent families, and the elderly. No doubt, these are key issues of concern in the wider community, but we can look back at the journey the Mainland has taken in the past two decades and see how innovation has played a pivotal part in the journey―from the “targeted poverty alleviation” strategy introduced in 2013 to the “rural revitalization” strategy in 2021. Our team at the University of Hong Kong has recently published the book, Poverty Alleviation Case Analysis in China―Poverty Alleviation Best Practices via Practices and SDG Strategies, with International Poverty Reduction Centre in China (IPRCC), with the support of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Previously under National Bureau of Rural Revitalization, the IPRCC now operates under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. By analysing different strategies implemented to address specific key pain points in focal regions and villages, via the effort and collaboration of key stakeholders, we can gain an overview of how the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can be achieved within the framework of Chinese national policy. 

The concept development of “poverty alleviation” starts with “who should help”, “who should be helped”, “how to help”, and “how to move on”. From the microscopic perspective, it involves details of the focal poverty conditions, including understanding the root causes of the users and regional pain points, along with their corresponding solutions. From the macroscopic perspective, it involves deploying a wider range of available resources to further long-term economic and industrial development. As the Chinese saying goes, “Giving someone fish is not as good as teaching someone to fish.” For example, in areas where low education levels among the youth compromise local industrial development, effective talent-cultivation programmes are established, with enterprises providing job-pairing assistance and the government organizing further training workshops. In remote areas, apart from infrastructure development and supply-chain establishment, comprehensive solutions combined with enhancement of cultural confidence to coordinate primary, secondary, and tertiary industries are also provided. In addition, creative solutions like wealth-creation evening schools supported by TV broadcasts are also introduced, with impact amplified by various online and offline supplementary activities. These collective efforts have enabled China to achieve the first target of the United Nation 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development―10 years ahead of schedule upon complete eradication of extreme poverty in the country. 

China’s achievements and related experience in poverty alleviation demonstrate that the key to success lies in an in-depth understanding of the pain points and core problems, coupled with deployment of available resources through coordinated efforts among local governments, nationwide enterprises, and government departments. The core factors are “in-depth understanding”, “coordinated efforts”, and “creative confidence”. This approach mirrors the principles of Design Thinking in problem-solving, which emphasizes empathy, interdisciplinary innovation, and iterative optimization. Since the launch of the “Unleash Hong Kong” initiative in 2018, the Hong Kong SAR Government has been supporting the application of Design Thinking and related training activities. This approach has proven effective in poverty alleviation cases. Further discussion is required to review whether this innovation strategy has been carried out thoroughly and whether its implementation is in-depth and creative enough.

A similar innovation strategy can be applied to the development of Web3 in Hong Kong.

Over the past decade, the decentralized blockchain protocol Web3 has brought about a digital revolution in the financial sector. While the financial market has experienced roller-coaster rides because of bitcoin and cryptocurrency, the resulting transformation extends beyond the speculation market. An even greater impact is seen in digital asset management, cross-border transactions, and the updating of financial, monetary, and securities policies. The Hong Kong Government aims to become an international Web3 hub and create a buzz in global financial markets to attract investors and capital. However, under the Design Thinking framework, it is worth considering how we can formulate an innovative strategy to fully align with the Policy Statement on the Development of Virtual Assets (VAs) in Hong Kong released in October 2022 and the vision of the Task Force on Promoting Web3 Development established in June 2023.

The general view is that 2025 will be a pivotal year for Real World Assets (RWA), a product generated by Web3 technology. RWAs are tangible assets like commodities or equities that have value in the real world. These assets can be divided through tokenization into smaller, more manageable units, broadening the investor base and enhancing market liquidity. Research has shown that financial institutions like JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs are actively promoting asset tokenization, which is estimated to have a market value of over US$10 trillion, and holds the potential to significantly raise market efficiency and liquidity.

Hong Kong’s robust financial system, strategic geographical position connecting Mainland China with overseas markets, and gradually opening regulatory environment provide a solid foundation for Web3 development and asset tokenization. Beyond real estate and bulk commodities, this state-of-the-art fintech tool is expanding into niche markets such as carbon credits, green finance, luxury collectibles, and intellectual property. It is encouraging that the SAR Government has launched a sandbox to facilitate experimentation with new ideas and has rolled out consultations and white papers on the topic. Despite challenges from regulatory fragmentation, custody risks, and limited secondary market liquidity, in order to embrace this financial technology and its ecosystem, we can start with asking the following questions: What assets are suitable for tokenization? Where do they come from? Who are the buyers? How to make good investments in the Web3 environment? And how to exit the market? The answers to these questions will guide Hong Kong on its path to becoming an International Web3 Centre.

In an increasingly complex geopolitical environment, China faces its own economic challenges. As the bridge between East and West, Hong Kong plays an important role in navigating an environment currently fraught with challenges and competition. It is therefore absolutely crucial that various sectors adopt an innovative strategy.

We can start with the three key ideas mentioned above: “in-depth understanding”, “coordinated efforts”, and “creative confidence”.

Dr Maurice Tse and Mr Clive Ho

7 May 2025

Released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2025, the World Economic Outlook significantly lowered global economic growth forecast from 3.3% in January 2025 to 2.8%. The report identifies China and India as the main growth engines, with the two countries predicted to contribute 23% and over 15% respectively to global economic growth in the next five years. The estimated contribution from America, nevertheless, has been lowered to 11.3% in view of the uncertainties surrounding its tariff policy.

Needless to say, the recovery of the economy worldwide is subject to the impact of continuing trade conflicts and policy uncertainties on both flanks.

Hegemony as self-destructive as it is damaging to international interests

The lowering of economic forecasts is primarily due to the tariff policy implemented by the Donald Trump Administration this year, which has caused supply chain disruptions and weakened investment sentiment, and has pushed up production costs of commodities worldwide. Forecasts indicate that global trade growth will decelerate to 1.5%, the US economy’s growth will be halved from 1.8% to 0.9%, and the eurozone economy’s growth will decline to 0.8%. The Institute of International Finance predicts that the US could experience negative growth in the second half of 2025.

According to Bloomberg’s latest survey of 82 economists conducted in April 2025, the US economy is projected to have a 45% chance of entering a recession within the next 12 months. This stems from increased tariffs imposed by the American government on various countries, which are expected to exert long-term pressure on consumption expenditure and economic growth.

In 2024, trade between China and the US totalled around US$585 billion, of which American imports from China, at US$440 billion, significantly exceeded American exports to China, which amounted to merely US$145 billion. The US trade deficit with China, at US$295 billion, accounted for roughly 1% of the US gross domestic product (GDP) (see Figure).

From Trump’s first term to Joe Biden’s presidency, the US has steadily raised tariffs on imports from China. The decline in the share of Chinese imports from 21% in 2016 to 13% in 2023 indicates America’s diminishing reliance on trade with China. Yet during the same period, some Chinese products, such as solar panels, found their way into the US via Southeast Asian countries. According to the US Department of Commerce’s data in 2023, Chinese solar panel manufacturers had relocated their assembly operations to Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The goods were then exported to the US, effectively circumventing tariffs.

If the US imposes reciprocal tariffs on these products manufactured in Southeast Asian countries, the prices of imports into the US market originating from China will inevitably rise.

Figure   US goods trade deficit with China

US imports from and exports to China (in US$ billion, seasonally adjusted), 1999–2024

US imports from China           2016: 479.7                 2024: 440

US exports to China                2016: 169.4                 2024: 145

Trade deficit                            2016: -310.3                2024: -295

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

Head-to-head comparison between China and US economies

In 2024, the largest American export product to China was soybeans, a key animal feed for China’s livestock industry. Chinese exports to the US mostly included electronics, computers, and toys. Among these, smartphones were the largest category, accounting for 9% of America’s total imports. A major part of the mobile phones consisted of Apple devices manufactured in China. Amid rising tariffs on Chinese goods, Apple’s market capitalization has plummeted, with its stock price collapsing 20% in the last month. These China-made US imports have become more expensive since the Trump administration implemented 20% tariffs. Should the tariff rate soar to 100% or higher, the price pressure on US consumers could quintuple. Meanwhile, China’s punitive tariffs on American imports will drive up the prices of US goods in the Mainland market, causing local consumers to incur losses.

Economic theory has long recognized that tariffs raise the prices of imported goods, thus compromising consumers’ purchasing power. Inflated import costs also shoot up the production costs of domestic companies and affect related industries through supply chains, leading to a fall in production. Greater funding pressure on enterprises may even trigger a chain reaction that stymies the investment environment.

Furthermore, as a leading supplier of the world’s copper, lithium, rare earth elements, etc.―crucial for military equipment―China can choose to limit export of these minerals to the US, disrupting its defense industry and related manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, the US has already banned the export of advanced microchips, which China has yet to be able to produce domestically, and may also pressure countries such as Cambodia, Mexico, and Vietnam to curb their trade with China.

Tariffs set to boomerang on America itself

In the US government’s bid to levy at least 10% tariffs on most countries this time, some of the punitive tariffs have been put on a 90-day pause. However, as pointed out by research of Bloomberg Economics, America’s current effective tariff rate already stands at 23%, a record high in this century. This is bound to trigger a sharp contraction in US household demand, given that consumption expenditure is the driving force of the country’s GDP (with roughly a two-thirds share), and to induce an extra risk of economic recession.

International agencies warn that maintaining high tariffs on a long-term basis will have a cascading impact on global supply chains and economies. Data of Bloomberg shows that US imports in the first quarter of 2025 increased by 19.2% year-on-year, as companies managed to stock up in advance of the new tariffs. Even so, forecasts for US imports and exports towards 2027 have been adjusted downwards, with exports expected to decline until 2026. Retaliatory tariffs on American goods imposed by other countries, including China, will further undermine the international competitiveness of these goods.

Similarly, the potential repercussions on inflation should not be overlooked. Survey results reveal that the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Index at the end of 2025 is estimated to be 3.2% while the core PCE inflation rate is forecast to reach 3.3%, both of which are higher than the earlier estimate of 2.7%. According to Comerica Bank economists Bill Adams and Waran Bhahirethan, although America’s inflation is unlikely to return to its peak in 2022, inflation surge will narrow the Federal Reserve’s room for rate cuts. Despite the slowdown in economic growth, the labour market remains resilient. Forecasts indicate that unemployment rate in the US will edge up to 4.6% by the end of 2025, slightly higher than the previous estimate of 4.3%.

Progressive transformation of the Chinese economy

Undoubtedly, owing to the impact of the escalating US tariff policy, the growth forecast for the Chinese economy has been adjusted downwards to 4%, which is lower than the earlier forecast of 4.6%. In the opinion of economist Stephen S. Roach, while China’s state-led industrial policy may initially withstand the effects of the trade war, its export-oriented economy is likely to suffer heavily if tariff tensions continue to build up.

Even though China has advocated shifting from an export-oriented economy to one driven by domestic demand, achieving this transition will be no easy task. As a result of a less than perfect social security system, Chinese families prefer to scrimp and save, contributing minimally to consumption expenditure. In spite of the introduction of the “30-Point Action Plan to Lift Domestic Consumption”, which demonstrates the Central Government’s concern about related issues, the social security system still requires substantial improvement. The US tariff policy has not only exacerbated tensions between China and the US but has also limited the growth potential of both economies. In addition to addressing external pressures, China should also focus on internal structural problems. This will likely have a far-reaching impact on future economic developments.

The global bane of high tariffs

Given that China and the US together account for 43% of the world economy, if the two countries engage in a full-on trade war, it could cause a slowdown or recession, implicating global economic stability and severely compromising investment activities worldwide.

As the world’s largest manufacturer, China has a production capacity that significantly exceeds its domestic demand. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the nation exports much more than it imports. Thanks to policy measures such as government subsidies and low-interest loans, many products (e.g., steel) can be manufactured at lower than actual costs. Should Chinese companies find it impossible to export their products to the US, they will likely look elsewhere. Consequently, while consumers in other countries may benefit, manufacturers and employment in those markets will suffer. For example, UK Steel, the trade association for the UK steel industry, has already warned that the possibility of China’s excess capacity in steel production being redirected to the UK market could threaten related sectors in the UK.

Moreover, there is a consensus among economists regarding the China-US trade war that it will create highly destructive spillover effects. With a divergent trend among developing countries, some emerging markets could be subject to a greater impact. Growth in emerging markets and developing economies this year is projected to be reduced to 3.7%, which is 0.3% lower than the previous estimate. The downward pace of global inflation will also be slower than anticipated, with the average global inflation rate forecast to stand at 4.3% for the year. Developed economies are expected to face particularly intense inflationary pressures.

According to simulation analysis, should the tariff war further escalate, global economic growth could slide by another 1.5%, setting off seismic waves in the international financial market. Heightened multinational trade tensions will pose a long-term threat to productivity and economic growth. It is therefore essential to maintain stable trade policies. Governments worldwide should avoid taking unilateralist measures and should strengthen monetary policy coordination to prevent fragmentation of the global financial system.

Professor Heiwai Tang and Ms Yang Chen

30 April 2025

After seven years of negotiation, the world’s largest free-trade agreement―the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—officially took effect on 1 January 2022, covering close to 30% of the world’s population and accounting for over one-third of the global GDP. Amid intensifying global economic fragmentation, the RCEP carries high expectations. By encompassing both large and small Asia-Pacific countries with different systems, the agreement demonstrates great potential and resilience for inclusive regional cooperation.

What impacts has the RCEP had on the Asia-Pacific trade landscape since its implementation three years ago? How will it reshape the patterns of trade among its members? Based on the RCEP Trade Tracker developed by HKU Asia Global Institute (see Note), this article provides a comparative analysis of trade performance among RCEP economies between the first quarter of 2020 and the third quarter of 2024. The findings demonstrate the following four prevailing trends shaping trade dynamics under the agreement.

1. China remains the dominant exporter within the region, but its trade growth has clearly slowed down. While its exports to RCEP partners experienced a modest recovery in 2024 after a decline the previous year, the overall momentum has weakened.
2. In pursuit of a deliberate trade diversification strategy, Japan has strengthened ties with Vietnam, Malaysia, etc. while effectively reducing reliance on China. Its overall trade within the RCEP framework saw a marginal contraction in 2024.
3. After a downturn in 2023, intra-ASEAN trade recorded a strong rebound by 7% in 2024, reflecting deepening regional economic integration and providing member nations with a fresh growth impetus.
4. RCEP economies are increasingly trading with non-member countries. In 2024, this trade expanded by 5% to reach US$3.4 trillion, surpassing intra-RCEP trade growth for the first time.

Trend 1: Mild growth of China’s trade with RCEP  

As a core RCEP member, China has been playing a prominent role in regional trade. In the first three quarters of 2024, its exports to RCEP nations totalled US$2.76 billion. The 3.6% year-on-year increase marks a cautious recovery following an 8.5% downturn in 2023. This modest rebound suggests that China’s trade within the region has entered a phase of steady growth.

In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, China’s exports to the RCEP bloc surged by an impressive 24.9% in 2021, followed by continued strong growth in 2022. However, Chinese exports to the RCEP bloc contracted for the first time by 8.5% in 2023, as a result of global supply chain restructuring and intense competition from ASEAN manufacturing industries.

The uptick in 2024 was accompanied by a significant change in market structure. On the one hand, China’s exports to Japan have fallen for two consecutive years (by 1.9% in 2024 and 5.1% in 2023), indicating that Japan is actively diversifying its supply chains and gradually reducing dependency on China. On the other hand, the performance of the Vietnamese market stood out. China’s exports to this market rose by 12.7%, reversing the 7.5% decline in 2023. This demonstrates Vietnam’s escalating status in the global supply chains.

Within the ASEAN region, China’s trade performance varied. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam recorded the fastest annual growth of 17.7%, 14.6%, and 12.7% respectively for Chinese exports. This underscores the rising economic vibrancy of the Indo-Chinese countries. In comparison, the relatively mature markets such as Singapore and Thailand maintained stable growth at around 6%, while Indonesia registered a slight growth of 0.3%. China’s exports to Australia and Myanmar shrank by 7.5% and 17.6% respectively, due to weaker demand triggered by domestic factors in both countries.

Particularly noteworthy is that China’s exports to South Korea showed a remarkable recovery in 2024, incrementing by 9.6%, mainly thanks to renewed demand for electronic components and industrial equipment. This change not only hinges on a resurgence of manufacturing in South Korea, but also testifies to the positive effect of RCEP tariff concessions on high-tech supply chains.

On the whole, while China remains the largest trade hub within the RCEP, intra-bloc trade flows have diversified. This shift is simultaneously driven by members’ industrial upgrading and supply chain adjustments, as well as the deepening progress in regional economic integration under the RCEP agreement.

Trade ties between China and RCEP partners have entered a new phase. On the one hand, with its comprehensive industrial system and scale advantages, China will continue to serve as the key supplier of mechanical equipment and electronic products. On the other hand, by upgrading their manufacturing capabilities and signing diversified trade agreements, the ASEAN countries gradually reduce overdependence on a single market. Such a state of dynamic equilibrium is expected to continue reshaping the future trade map of the RCEP region.

Trend 2: Gradual stabilization of Japan’s trade with RCEP after pandemic volatility

From 2020 onwards, Japan’s trade relations with RCEP countries have been characterized by fluctuating patterns of both substantial ups and downs. Despite a remarkable 23.2% growth in its exports to RCEP nations in 2021, the momentum soon faded. Japan’s total exports to the region plunged by 13.3% in 2023 and further dropped by 3.5% in 2024, reflecting a persistent cooling of regional demand.

One of the most striking shifts is Japan’s evolving relationship with ASEAN markets. The Vietnamese and Malaysian markets are fairly resilient, with Japan’s exports to these two markets expanding steadily, in contrast to the sharp declines of 11.8% and 12.9% to Thailand and Indonesia respectively. Japan’s trade with the Philippines, after a staggering 19.1% contraction in 2023, experienced a diminished decline to 2.6% in 2024, showing initial signs of stabilization.

These diversification trends align with Japan’s strategic adjustments to its supply chains, prioritizing Vietnam and Malaysia as important bases because of their prosperous manufacturing sectors, lower production costs, and active participation in strategic trade pacts, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the RCEP, in support of Japan’s China+1 strategy for supply chain diversification. In contrast, owing to higher production costs, political uncertainties, and slower economic recovery, Thailand and Indonesia are notably less competitive among Japanese export markets.

Clearly evident is Japan’s progressive disengagement from the Chinese market. In 2020, China was Japan’s primary trading partner within the region, representing 48% of Japan’s total RCEP-bound exports. This percentage slipped to 41.7% in 2023 but slightly rebounded to 42.8% in 2024, illustrating China’s indispensable role and the structural constraints Japan faces in its endeavours to redirect trade dynamics.

Trend 3: Intra-ASEAN trade growth outpacing RCEP bloc

Intra-ASEAN trade showed strong growth in 2021 and 2022, followed by an unforeseen contraction of 13.3% in 2023 but a modest recovery of 7.03% in 2024. These volatilities suggest that, in addition to facing external impacts including a slowdown in global trade and supply chain disruptions, some ASEAN economies were also subject to the structural problem of weak domestic demand.

Nevertheless, intra-ASEAN trade performed better than intra-RCEP trade. In 2022, intra-ASEAN trade growth even doubled that of the RCEP economies (see Figure), highlighting deepening regional economic integration within the ASEAN. Despite experiencing a downturn similar to intra-RCEP trade in 2023, intra-ASEAN trade recorded a pronounced rebound of 7.03% in 2024, demonstrating the ASEAN’s strengthening resistance to external impacts.

Trade performance varied across ASEAN members. Vietnam’s exports to the ASEAN region leapt by 23.6% and 26.2% in 2021 and 2022 respectively, resulting in an accumulated rise of over 50%. This achievement secured the country’s position as a key node in ASEAN’s supply chains. Despite a fall of 7.63% in 2023, Vietnam’s exports to other ASEAN nations rebounded with 3.92% growth in 2024, suggesting its trade network’s gradual adaptation to the new normal.

As for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, their trade performance was highly volatile. After surging by 21.2% and 39.6% in 2021 and 2022 respectively, trade among these countries saw a sharp decline of 18.6% in 2023, followed by an additional 8% drop in 2024. The downturn for two consecutive years implies that this trilateral trade may be facing structural challenges. In contrast, Thailand demonstrated stronger adaptability. After peaking at US$54.8 billion in 2022, Thailand’s intra-ASEAN exports declined by 10.3% in 2023 but rebounded with a 5.5% growth in 2024. This illustrates a recovery in demand for Thai exports, driven by a resurgence in investment and production activities within ASEAN.

Trend 4: RCEP deepening trade ties with non-members

Trade between RCEP members and non-member nations has exhibited a dynamic trajectory, reaching a total trade value of US$3.37 trillion in the first three quarters of 2024, representing a 5% increase over 2023. The most unprecedented expansion occurred in 2021, when trade shot up by nearly 30% (spurred by post-pandemic recovery and robust demand worldwide). Despite a temporary contraction of 7% from global economic downturn pressures in 2023, a rapid rebound in 2024 underscores the adaptability and resilience of the RCEP economies as they continued to strengthen their global trade networks.

South Korea has been a leading force in this expansion, with its exports to non-RCEP partners climbing to US$289 billion in 2024, marking a year-on-year growth of 12.8%. An extraordinary 30.62% jump in its exports to non-RCEP partners in 2021 signalled South Korea’s vitality and resilience, derived from its deep integration into the international market.

Indonesia’s journey, however, has been more turbulent. After skyrocketing by 33.68% and 35.1% in 2021 and 2022 respectively, its exports plummeted by 16.01% in 2023, reflecting multiple challenges, including weaker global demand, supply chain disruptions, and shifts in trade policies. While 2024 saw a minor increase of 3.14% in exports, the country’s pace of recovery clearly lagged behind that of other major economies in the region.

Overall, while intra-RCEP trade remains a vital driver of economic integration, member nations are actively diversifying their partnerships beyond the bloc, generating a vigorous export-oriented momentum. The RCEP is gradually transitioning from a regional economic growth engine to a pivotal force in reshaping the global trade landscape.

Note: https://www.asiaglobalinstitute.hku.hk/rcep-trade-tracker

Dr Yifei Zhang

23 April 2025

In April 2025, global financial markets witnessed a textbook case of a credit crisis. The yield on the US 10-year treasury bonds shot up over 50 basis points within a single week, reaching a peak of 4.5%, marking the biggest weekly increase since the aftermath of the 9-11 incident in 2001. This phenomenon has not only subverted the traditional belief that the US treasury bonds are the world’s safest assets, but has also highlighted the deep-rooted vulnerabilities in the US dollar credit system.

American debt market in the midst of risky changes

The key to gasping the severity of this crisis involves understanding the fundamental financial concept of the “risk-free rate”. Long regarded as the anchor of global asset pricing, the US treasury yield has been used as a benchmark for calculating stock valuations, foreign exchange rates, and even residential mortgage rates. The core of the credit system hinges on the American government’s ability to repay its debts. Theoretically, the government can print money to meet its debt obligations, making a default improbable. However, if the market starts to question such a logic, the stability of the entire financial system is subject to challenge.

Apparently, the crisis has been triggered by technical factors. On 8 April 2025, the US Treasury Department’s auction of three-year treasury notes drew weak demand, receiving bids only 2.26 times the amount offered, registering a record low since 2023. However, an even deeper structural conflict lies in the fact that the basis trade strategy of hedge funds amplifies market fluctuations. Given the 50 times leverage on yield spreads between long-term and short-term government bonds under this strategy, if the yield fluctuates by more than 1%, positions exceeding US$600 billion would be forced to close, potentially leading to a chain stampede. During the recent mass exodus of traditional bond buyers, China has reduced its holdings of US bonds for two consecutive months and has augmented its gold reserves. Amid the weak-yen crisis, Japan has dumped US bonds to rescue its economy. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has begun settling oil payments in RMB through Hong Kong’s Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS).

The fact that the above three major events coincided is no coincidence. As the world’s largest holder of US treasury bonds, China has been disposing of its holdings, thus weakening the demand for the dollar as the official reserve currency. Japan’s passive selling of American bonds reveals the weakness of US treasuries amid extreme foreign exchange volatility. Saudi Arabia’s attempt to settle trade transactions in local currency poses a direct challenge to the monopolistic status of the dollar in bulk commodity pricing. Once the greenback has been compromised as the “official reserve currency anchor”, a “stable foreign exchange rate anchor”, and a “bulk commodity pricing anchor”, markets will come to realize that the myth of “risk-free asset” is actually a collective compromise made by countries in response to America’s financial and military hegemony during the globalization era.

According to data from the US Department of Treasury, the federal government’s interest expenses for 2025 could amount to US$1.5 trillion, representing one-third of its fiscal revenue. If American bond yields continue to surge, the US may find itself in a debt abyss ― repaying old debts by borrowing anew, thereby triggering a sovereign credit crisis. The disintegration of this logic signifies an unprecedented threat to the US dollar-centric financial order worldwide in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Market logic disrupted by weaponization of tariffs

In the traditional financial model, a stock market crash often redirects fund flows to government bonds, which are considered a safe haven. However, the market performance this month utterly upended this principle. Within merely a week, the US stock market lost US$8 trillion in value, while the US Dollar Index plunged below the 100 mark. Instead of prompting investors to seek refuge in US treasury bonds, the three markets―US stocks, bonds, and foreign exchanges―experienced simultaneous crashes. These market anomalies stem from the White House’s policy vacillations, compounded by geopolitical rivalry.

Trump’s tariff policy has become a catalyst for market volatility. His administration adjusted tariff rates on China three times within eight days, driving the rates up to 145%. Besides making it impossible for enterprises to formulate long-term production plans, policy uncertainty has also created chaos in supply chain arrangements within 90 days. Investors find themselves in a “liquidity black hole”, where assets including stocks, bonds, and foreign exchanges have all become high-risk targets, leaving cash as the only investment option. Although the White House has suspended some of the tariffs, the persistent 10% baseline rate and the 90-day pause are insufficient to alleviate the ongoing panic.

The impact of the self-undermining hegemonic US dollar is particularly far-reaching. America’s frequent weaponization of the financial system has compelled China and Russia to switch to local currency settlement, resulting in 83% of their energy trade being decoupled from the dollar-denominated system. Saudi Arabia has begun conducting oil trade transactions in RMB through Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure, directly challenging the dollar’s monopolistic status in bulk commodity pricing. There are market concerns that the US may resort to legal defaults to address its national debt crisis. This could involve forcing other countries to convert short-term American bonds into 50-year zero-coupon bonds, effectively shifting American bonds from a safe-haven instrument to a source of risk.

Investment pointers on navigating the financial paradigm shift

Beyond altering the market’s operational logic, the current crisis has reshaped public awareness of the nature of the financial system. The changes reflected in the three macroeconomic indicators below are instrumental in fostering people’s understanding of the new financial order.

Extent of the inverted US bond yield curve. An inverted yield curve, i.e. short-term bond yields higher than long-term bond yields, is a warning sign of an economic recession. Currently, the latest rate difference between 10-year American bonds and two-year treasuries has widened to -120 basis points, signifying the steepest inverted yield curve since 1981. Evidently, the market has grown wary of the US government’s financial sustainability. Once interest expenses consume two-thirds of fiscal revenue (estimated figure amounting to US$1.5 trillion in 2025), investors would demand higher risk premiums.

Share of US dollar in global reserves. Data of the International Monetary Fund shows that the share of US dollar as the world’s reserve currency has slid from 73% in 2001 to 52% in the first quarter of 2025. This drop coincides with rising allocations to RMB-denominated foreign-exchange reserves and gold holdings, reflecting a re-assessment of the dollar’s credit stability among central banks worldwide. Saudi Arabia’s use of RMB to settle oil trades via Hong Kong’s CIPS system exhibits a microcosmic sign of de-dollarization.

Share of RMB in cross-border payments. The use of RMB in international trade settlement has soared from 2.7% in 2022 to 9.3% in April 2025. As the world’s largest offshore RMB centre with deposits surpassing RMB1.2 trillion, Hong Kong serves as a vital window for observing the geoeconomic power shift.

Hong Kong’s unique position in global financial order transition

The financial turmoil of 2015 is in essence a collective reflection on “American exceptionalism”. As the Trump administration attempts to maintain American hegemony through tariffs and sanctions, international markets react by dumping US bonds, stocks, and dollars. This crisis signals an irreversible trend away from sole reliance on the dollar, heralding a multipolar transformation of the global financial system.

Much like its role as an entrepot in the dollar-gold delink in 1971, Hong Kong now stands both as a witness to the fading old order and as a testing ground for the emerging new rules. The dynamic balance of the city’s Linked Exchange Rate System, the gradual internationalization of the RMB, and its position bridging Eastern and Western capital jointly provide individuals with a micro-perspective on the changing macroeconomic landscape.

While the investment bank traders in New York continue to debate over when the US Federal Reserve will cut rates, bankers in Hong Kong have already quietly increased their holdings of the Vietnamese Dong and the Malaysian Ringgit. The support for these currencies lies in Southeast Asian factories taking over parts of Chinese industrial chains. This may represent a new way forward for globalization: as the dollar hegemony progressively loses steam, nimble, small open economies have taken the initiative to carve out niches for their survival. It is within these niches that Hong Kong is proactively sowing the seeds for its future growth.

Dr Tingting Fan

16 April 2025

To answer the question of the coolest thing at the moment: it is not the luxury brand Chanel or Taylor Swift on a world tour; it is a plush toy named Labubu, featuring pointy ears, devilish large eyes, and a row of nine fangs. This strange-looking creature has become such an overnight sensation worldwide that even K-pop girl group Blackpink idols Lisa, Jennie, and Rosé have become its loyal fans. From Hong Kong to Bangkok and from Jakarta to Paris, young people are lining up outside Pop Mart retail shops to get their hands on the plush toy.

Hong Kong’s home-grown father of Labubu

Labubu was created by Kasing Lung, a Hong Kong-born artist raised in the Netherlands. Drawing inspiration from Nordic folklore, he designed “The Monsters” series in 2015, introducing the universally popular Labubu, the tribe leader Zimomo, and Skull Tycoco.

In 2019, Lung entered into an exclusive agreement with Pop Mart, a Chinese pop culture and entertainment company, to establish The Monsters as a proprietary intellectual property (IP). Apart from launching different thematic series, the company also produces a wide variety of merchandise, ranging from blind boxes (contents inside remain a mystery until opened) and plush toys to refrigerator magnets and earphone cases.

In 2024, Labubu, a character from The Monsters series, made its unexpected appearance on the Instagram of Blackpink’s Lisa, a Thai national. The character soon caught the fancy of a Thai princess and even became Thailand’s official tourism ambassador. Thanks to Pop Mart’s network of over 500 stores in more than 30 countries and its successful sales strategy, Labubu now enjoys a devoted fan base across the world.

The discerning IP “talent scout”

Pop Mart, the company behind the must-have Labubu, is no newcomer to the scene. It was founded in 2010 by Wang Ning. He was inspired by Hong Kong’s LOG-ON and Japan’s Loft to position Pop Mart as a mecca for trendy collectible shopping, offering all sorts of whimsical cultural and creative toys. Although the company experienced instant success with consumers, new e-merchants flooding the market with similar on-trend goods have intensified price competition and eroded profit margins. Hence Pop Mart was gradually losing its competitive edge.

Fortunately, in late 2015, Pop Mart discovered Sonny Angel, a Japanese toy brand that sold like hot cakes across Asia. Featuring “Mini Figure” sold in blind boxes, the series may not fetch high unit prices but the constant launch of new series, coupled with hidden editions and limited editions, offered vast variety and turned them into hard-to-get collectibles. As a result, there has been no shortage of demand from fans.

Given the business opportunities afforded by the Sonny Angel brand, Pop Mart decided to explore the possibility of developing its own trendy toy IP. From Molly created by Hong Kong designer Kenny Wong, Satyr Rory by Korean designer Seulgie Lee, to Hirono and Snowy by Beijing artist Lang, Pop Mart has not only been discovering and signing trendy toy designers from around the world like a “talent scout”, but has also built up its own design team to launch such IP products as Crybaby, Minico, and Zsiga.

Putting customers first with a vertically-integrated business model

Similar to the many contracted artists of a record company, not every IP can become a hit. Pop Mart’s business process is unique in that from IP incubation and design to supply chain production, marketing, and sales, every aspect of the process testifies to the company’s keen insight into consumer demand.

Pop Mart’s targeted consumer group consists of young people aged between 18 and 29, 75% of whom are women with considerable spending power. Besides being trend-conscious and appearance-minded, these women are avid social media users who readily invest in quality-of-life improvements they can afford. To understand the preferences of these hip youngsters, Pop Mart has established close ties with consumers through its flagship stores on Tianmao and JD.com, live broadcasts on TikTok, as well as its own official app. Since 2019, Pop Mart has collaborated with Tencent Smart Retail to conduct in-depth analyses of consumers’ preferences and purchase behaviour, keeping a pulse on market trends.  Consumer experience acts as an instant feedback loop, informing the company’s IP design and sales strategy.

The moment an artist is signed, Pop Mart will go about optimizing the IP image based on the IP’s style and audience, along with market feedback. Take Labubu’s blind box introduced in 2018 for example. Across all three generations of products launched so far, not only has the skin colour of the toys gradually become fairer, but the chestnut hair has also turned creamy white, achieving a softer colour tone and a warmer image. All these changes are intended to cater to consumer preferences.

Essential insights for sustaining popularity

Pop Mart’s priority on consumer experience is also demonstrated through seamless coordination between offline and online sales. Its offline brand stores focus not merely on sales but also on “planting grass”, i.e. showcasing the best images of all IPs to spark consumer interest, with the ultimate aim of growing a wider fan base. After logging onto the company’s app, consumers will receive personalized recommendations for new products as well as promotional information and activities, effectively turning curious onlookers into paying customers.

After app users make the first purchase, Pop Mart will further strengthen their purchase stickiness. On the one hand, it keeps churning out new images and products. For instance, an average of 5.8 blind boxes were launched each month in 2020, stimulating users’ desire to collect them. On the other hand, through integrated online and offline operations, it provides members with social interaction and innovative engagement initiatives (e.g. Mystery Bag and Adventure). To compensate for the limited number of physical retail stores, Pop Mart also incorporates a blind box mini-programme into its app, simulating blind box lucky draw experience in the stores. This initiative quickly attracts a large number of users by offering engaging consumer interactions, such as box selection and box shaking. In 2022, sales generated via this channel reached RMB950 million, accounting for almost half of the total online sales.

Can the smash hit Labubu also boost the popularity of other IP products? Can Pop Mart’s explosive growth be sustainable? The answers to these questions do not simply exist in the success of a few celebrity influencers driving live-stream sales, nor do they solely depend on the workings of scarcity marketing. The crux actually lies in sustained insights into the business or even the ability to lead the trendy young generation. Alex Zhou, Chief Consumer Officer of Pop Mart, hit the nail on the head when he said, “Pop Mart is a very typical crowd brand.” In his view, enterprises cater to distinct consumer groups sharing the same interests and passions. The key to sustainable growth hinges on how best to reach them effectively and repeatedly (see Note).

Note: https://finance.sina.com.cn/enterprise/2024-09-05/doc-incnrssq1236202.shtml#:~:text=”泡泡瑪特是,更好的人群運營%E3%80%82″

Dr Y.F. LUK

9 April 2025

On the so-called “Liberation Day” last week, Donald Trump announced reciprocal tariffs on other countries as a perfect example of what it means to defy the world. Using the false narrative that America has long been ripped off by other nations as a pretext, new tariffs are imposed on almost all economies, covering the widest spectrum in history. This scheme is nonetheless typical of Trump’s slapdash and self-contradictory nature. If the American trade deficit reflects other nations’ unfair treatment of the US, then what about its trade surplus with Australia? Why levy a 10% tariff on Australian imports? Moreover, the American trade deficit only lies in goods while the US is the world’s largest exporter of services. In 2024, one quarter of the US goods trade deficit, amounting to US$1.22 trillion, was offset by its surplus in services trade, which amounted to US$300 billion. Naturally, none of these facts were mentioned in Trump’s speech.

As for the setting of tariff rates for different countries, Trump’s cavalier and high-handed approach might appear to be professional on the surface, but in actual fact, it is simply devoid of any economic basis. While he claims to calculate other nations’ average tariff rates on the US, the result, however, has absolutely nothing to do with foreign-imposed tariffs. Such a calculation method has sparked off furore in economic circles worldwide. This calls to mind the recent saga in which Peter Navarro, Trump’s counsellor for trade and manufacturing, cited the opinion of one expert named Ron Vara in his own book to support his views. Navarro later admitted that Ron Vara did not exist. The fictional expert was created by himself to lend credence to his book. Navarro, a trusted advisor of Trump, was already on the White House staff during Trump’s first presidency. There is no telling whether he is behind Trump’s current tariff policy. In any case, this episode may well be cited as a funny joke in economic history textbooks in future.

The fact that the reciprocal tariff rates are higher than market expectations has rapidly sent shock waves across economic and financial markets. According to calculations of the Budget Lab at Yale (see Note 1), after incorporating the reciprocal tariffs announced on 2 April 2025 and previously announced tariffs, including two rounds of 10% on China; 25% on Canada and Mexico; as well as 25% on all motor vehicles, steel, and aluminium, the average effective US tariff rate now stands at 22.5%. This marks the highest level since 1909, surpassing the levies imposed under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act during the Great Depression in 1930. The Yale Budget Lab has also estimated that the tariffs combined will push up American prices by 2.3% in the short term, cutting household expenditure by US$3,800 on average and reducing US real GDP growth rate by 0.9% in 2025. These consequences are serious enough even without considering countermeasures by other countries. In view of the significant damage to the US economy, why does the Trump administration continue to revel in waging the tariff war and keep raising the stakes?

Despite Trump’s claim of non-involvement, it is still possible to tease out information from two reports on the US economic policy under his second-term presidency. One report, published by the Heritage Foundation to target its own soil and government departments, is called Project 2025 (see note 2). The other report, written by Stephen Miran, newly appointed Chair of the US Council of Economic Advisers, has been released by another think tank, focusing on the relations between America and international trade and finance (see Note 3). Both reports are similar in that they advocate sweeping reforms driven by dissatisfaction with existing systems.

In Miran’s opinion, one severe economic problem of the US lies in the dollar’s status as the primary foreign exchange reserve currency. Although central banks still hold gold since it was delinked from the US dollar in 1971, US dollar-denominated assets, particularly American treasurys, have increasingly been a major reserve for central banks. With the growth in the global economy, so too grows the demand for foreign reserve assets, thereby sustaining the high exchange rate of the greenback. This has stunted US exports on the one hand and driven up US imports on the other, dealing a blow to the manufacturing sector. In effect, America’s role as a reserve-asset provider is becoming more burdensome. Miran argues that other countries must now shoulder part of the costs. To achieve this goal, the US should impose new tariffs and depreciate the dollar.

To many commentators, the status of US dollar assets as the world’s key foreign reserve is a great boon to America. The reason behind this is that, in order to hold US dollars, which have no intrinsic value, other countries must first export products of value to the US. This phenomenon has come to be known as America’s “exorbitant privilege”, a term coined by the French decades ago. This reveals differing perspectives on how American currency flows to other countries. To Miran and some economists, countries that intend to hold dollars as a foreign exchange reserve or investment tool have to curb consumption and expand savings. The surplus products are then exported to the US, creating a trade surplus with America. Perhaps more economists believe that overconsumption — including that of foreign products  — by the American government and individuals is the cause of trade deficit, which is then addressed by printing more banknotes to pay other nations.

Nevertheless, Miran thinks tariffs and exchange rates are the game changers. On the one hand, he does not want the US to relinquish the dollar’s status as a foreign reserve asset and wants it to continue to enjoy the “exorbitant privilege”. Recently, Trump threatened punitive tariffs on BRICS nations if they continue to push for de-dollarization. On the other hand, he expects other countries to foot the bill. Trump’s modus operandi aligns with his own deal-making style. Since many countries maintain dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves, Trump is raising tariffs on almost all nations, irrespective of whether they run trade surpluses or deficits with the US. Those with larger trade surpluses and thus are more likely in possession of huge dollar reserves generally face higher tariffs. This may explain America’s tariff calculation methodology but it is unclear whether it originated with the Trump administration.  

Tariffs increase the dollar prices of foreign products on US soil and diminish the amount of foreign products that American consumers buy. This is precisely what tariffs are meant to achieve: provide uncompetitive domestic companies with some leeway to survive. At the same time, this clearly demonstrates that tariffs are borne by American consumers rather than by the exporting countries, contrary to Trump’s claims. Nevertheless, rising prices are not what Americans want. After all, Trump won the presidential race last year primarily due to voters’ dissatisfaction with inflation under the Biden administration. Now that tariffs are raised on multiple countries, prices of both imports and domestic substitutes are expected to surge. Miran has come up with “currency offset” as his own take to address this point. He contends that currency devaluation of exporting countries will follow the implementation of the new US tariffs. Firstly, US demand for both foreign products and currencies will slow down. Secondly, exporting countries may take the initiative to depreciate their currencies to promote exports as a means of counteracting the pressure of US tariffs. Miran views the resulting weakening of exporting countries’ purchasing power on the international market as tantamount to shouldering US tariffs. He points out that in the wake of the first round of China-US trade war between 2018 and 2019, inflation did not emerge in the US. Relevant data shows that during this round of trade war, varying tariffs averaging below 20% have been imposed on different Chinese imports. The exchange rate of the RMB to the US dollar depreciated by approximately 10% from mid-2018 to the end of 2019.

This year, the US have levied tariffs on nearly every country, with an average rate of 22.5% as mentioned above. The impact on prices in the US will inevitably be more significant compared with 2018, casting doubt on the effectiveness of Miran’s “currency offset” concept. Given that the tariff war has just started, national governments are still formulating their responses and it remains to be seen whether they will adopt China’s example of taking strong countermeasures. In the face of tit-for-tat tariff hikes worldwide, to what extent could fluctuations in currency exchange rates counteract the resulting fluctuations in prices and inflation?

Furthermore, if, as Miran predicts, all other currencies depreciate against the dollar to a certain extent following America’s tariff rise, this would mean the greenback will remain strong, setting the scenario back to square one: both the US trade deficit and external debt will persist while other countries will continue to hold dollars as foreign exchange reserves. What then springs to mind is the Mar-a-Lago Accord, which has been frequently mentioned in the media of late. Similarly, the 1985 Plaza Accord was prompted by the US trade deficit. During the meeting convened at the Plaza Hotel in New York, America pressured Japan and Western European countries to appreciate their currencies, which in turn facilitated the appreciation of the US dollar, as the US threatened to raise import tariffs on these nations. The Trump administration is probably attempting to replicate the same trick, which explains Trump’s scheme to establish a global tariff mechanism. Yet unlike four decades ago, America’s trade deficit is no longer largely derived from its allies. After decades of globalization, America now also has a trade deficit with many economies. To reinforce influence over American allies, Trump would offer military protection as a quid pro quo for these countries allowing their currencies to appreciate against the dollar, in effect transferring some of the costs related to maintaining the dollar’s international status. At the end of the day, everything is deal-making to Trump. Nonetheless, less than three months into his second term, Trump’s vacillations and his team’s incompetence have rapidly eroded the trust of other countries. How much value can still be placed on US military protection?

To the Trump administration, tariffs serve as both a means and an end. In addition to what is mentioned above, tariffs can directly generate revenue for the government. Although tariffs cannot fully replace major taxes, they can be instrumental in promoting reindustrialization to some extent. Nevertheless, the glory days of American industry are unlikely to be rapidly resurrected as industrial development takes time. How long the US economy can sustain itself amid the high tariffs remains to be seen. In essence, the grave danger of America’s tariff stick lies not in the tariffs per se but in Trump’s understanding of tariffs and trade, along with his governing team’s competence. Regrettably, the whole world is thrown into pointless chaos because of these individuals and this turmoil has just begun.

Note 1: https://budgetlab-yale-edu.eproxy.lib.hku.hk/

Note 2: https://static.project2025.org /2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf

Note 3: www.hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/hudsonbay/research/638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf