Latest Research Publications

A growing number of people today are participating in the gig economy, working as independent contractors on short-term projects. We study the effects of competition on gig workers’ effort and creativity on a Chinese novel-writing platform. Authors produce and sell their works chapter by chapter under a revenue-sharing or pay-by-the-word contract with the platform. Exploiting a regulation that induced a massive entry of novels in the romance genre but not other genres, we find that, on average, intensified competition led authors to produce content more quickly, whereas its effect on book novelty was weak. However, revenue-sharing books responded to competition substantially more than pay-by-the-word books, particularly regarding novelty. Moreover, the effect of competition on novelty is considerably stronger for books at earlier stages of the product life cycle. Finally, the platform increased the promotion of contracted books, which disproportionately favored pay-by-the-word books. We discuss the implications of these results for creative workers, platform firms, and policy makers in the gig economy.

The prior literature on role congruity theory has revolved around demographic-based expectations, emphasizing role incongruity derived from a mismatch between prescriptive expectations of distinct roles. In this study, we depart from this traditional focus on between-role incongruity and explore an alternative source of role incongruity by examining how language can trigger the within-role incongruity of function-based expectations. Through an analysis of conference call transcripts and contracts for 7,649 deals during 2003–2018, we show that the incongruity of function-based expectations manifested through the language of the CFO leads banks to employ more debt contract covenants. This takes place because such incongruity increases banks’ perceived hazards. In addition, by investigating the moderating effects of corresponding CEO language and media sentiment, we show how the social context and sentiment toward the firm weaken this incongruity effect. We discuss the theoretical implications of our study for future research on the sources of role incongruity and the antecedents of contract design.

The prior literature on role congruity theory has revolved around demographic-based expectations, emphasizing role incongruity derived from a mismatch between prescriptive expectations of distinct roles. In this study, we depart from this traditional focus on between-role incongruity and explore an alternative source of role incongruity by examining how language can trigger the within-role incongruity of function-based expectations. Through an analysis of conference call transcripts and contracts for 7,649 deals during 2003–2018, we show that the incongruity of function-based expectations manifested through the language of the CFO leads banks to employ more debt contract covenants. This takes place because such incongruity increases banks’ perceived hazards. In addition, by investigating the moderating effects of corresponding CEO language and media sentiment, we show how the social context and sentiment toward the firm weaken this incongruity effect. We discuss the theoretical implications of our study for future research on the sources of role incongruity and the antecedents of contract design.

We examine how a firm's disclosure-audience policy affects investors' expertise acquisition and price informativeness in the market. We distinguish the investors' information advantage due to superior access from that due to superior ability to process information. We show that targeted selective disclosure to sophisticated investors may encourage greater expertise acquisition on the part of investors and lead to more informative prices than either public disclosure or untargeted selective disclosure, because the value of expertise is maximized if sophisticated investors gain exclusive information access at a relatively low cost. These results illuminate the persistence of private communications between investors and firms in the post–Regulation Fair Disclosure era and provide implications for regulators in addressing increasing concerns raised about the enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure.

This study examines the usefulness of analysts' book value forecasts and the economic factors driving analysts' issuance of these forecasts. Guided by the real-options-based valuation model (ROM) of Zhang (2000), we explicitly link book value forecasts to the need for such information in valuation. We first establish that analysts' book value forecasts are superior to forecasts that are mechanically imputed from analysts' own earnings forecasts and those from random walk models and are incrementally informative beyond analysts' earnings, cash flow, and dividend forecasts. We then employ the ROM to explore the distinct information embedded in book value forecasts and analysts' decisions to issue these forecasts. Consistent with our expectations, we find that (i) book value forecasts convey growth information that is significantly correlated with ex ante indicators of real options, while analysts' earnings forecasts do not display this property; and (ii) analysts issue more book value forecasts when either growth options or, to a lesser extent, abandonment options are an important part of firm value. Our study sheds light on how analysts' book value forecasts are useful and under what circumstances analysts provide such information to meet investors' needs.

We show that managers have a propensity to disproportionately report total revenues just above base-ten thresholds (e.g., 10 million, 30 million, 1 billion) and examine motives for and consequences of this behavior. Focusing on base-ten thresholds in revenues is important because, despite being unusually prevalent in revenue targets set in executive compensation contracts, analyst forecasts, and management forecasts, they have not been previously explored. We also show that pressure to beat these targets provides one explanation for the base-ten bias in reported revenues. However, these incentive effects do not offer a complete explanation because base-ten threshold-beating is observed even in the absence of these explicit targets. We further find that when firms beat a base-ten threshold for the first time, they experience increases in news coverage, institutional ownership, liquidity, and analyst following, even after controlling for whether they have beaten other common benchmarks. These results suggest that managers also beat base-ten thresholds in order to increase their firms' overall visibility. Overall, we show that a preference for base-ten numbers, which have no inherent economic meaning, has a measurable effect on the actions of market participants. These results open the door to a new range of managerial targets previously unexplored.

Firms in many industries obtain superior knowledge of customer preferences through industry experience or data analytics, whereas customers often need costly efforts to learn their match values. In this paper, we examine the situations under which a customer chooses whether to inspect upon observing her personalized price from a firm with superior knowledge. On the surface, it seems that the firm can use personalized prices to directly communicate the customers’ match value, and thus there is no need for customers to expend inspection efforts. However, we find that in equilibrium the firm may trick low-preference customers into overpaying more than their match value, even when the inspection cost is low. The opportunistic incentives induce customer suspicions, which may lead to excessive customer inspection that would be avoided if the firm were not capable of price discrimination. Therefore, personalized pricing cannot obviate customer inspection. Since inspection cost raises a deadweight loss in social welfare, public policies that prevent firms from price-discriminating against customers may benefit both firms and customers.

People’s schedules are jointly determined by their biological clock and social clock. However, their social clock often deviates from the biological clock (e.g., having to get up earlier than one’s natural wake-up time for work or study, having to stay up to work night shifts or meet a project deadline)—a phenomenon known as “social jetlag.” How does social jetlag impact consumer behavior? Using field data and experiments, we show that social jetlag decreases conspicuous consumption because consumers experiencing social jetlag are less interested in social interaction. This effect is weakened when social interaction occurs among familiar others rather than strangers, when conspicuous consumption does not draw social attention, and when consumers expect to use a luxury product in a private setting.

This paper uses individual-level data linking stock investments with work performance to examine how changes in stock market wealth affect worker output. We document that a 10% increase in monthly income from stock market investments is associated with a decrease of 3.8% in the same investor’s next-month work output. The negative output response is not driven by concurrent economic conditions and is unexplained by investor-specific liquidity needs. Consistent with the reference dependence interpretation, the response is short-lived and the effect is stronger when the total income has reached a reference income. Overall, our results highlight a novel channel of transmitting stock market fluctuation through labor supply.