IMG_0029-for-website (2)
Prof. Yuk-fai FONG
Economics
Management and Strategy
Associate Dean (Taught Postgraduate)
Professor

3917 0026

KK 1101

Academic & Professional Qualification

  • PhD: Boston University
  • Master: Chinese University of Hong Kong (MPhil)
  • Bachelor: Chinese University of Hong Kong (BSSc)

Biography

Professor Yuk-fai Fong is a Professor of Management and Strategy, with joint appointment in Economics. Prior to HKU, he has taught at Kellogg School of Management and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Professor Fong received his BSSc and MPhil in Economics from Chinese University of Hong Kong, and PhD in Economics from Boston University.

His research interests include Industrial Organization, Competition Policy, Dynamic Games, and Applied Microeconomic Theory. He serves as an Editor for B.E. Journals of Theoretical Economics and Associate Editor for International Journal of Industrial Organization. His research has appeared at leading international journals such as Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economics Studies, RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, International Economics Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Industrial Economics, and Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. He has consulted for companies such as Shell Oil Company and Platinum Guild International, and is an academic affiliate with Compass LexEcon. Professor Fong won the HKUST Franklin Prize for Teaching Excellent (MBA Required Courses) in 2017, and was a finalist for the award in 2013, 2014, and 2016.

Teaching

  • HKU: EMBA Strategic Management, EMBA Managerial Economics, MBA Managerial Economics, MBA Python for Managers and Strategists, MEcon Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy; Undergrad Strategic Management
  • HKUST: EMBA Orientation Program, EMBA Homecoming Module, EMBA Managerial Microeconomics, Kellogg-HKUST EMBA Talk, MBA Opening Module, MBA Homecoming, MBA Managerial Microeconomics, ExecEd Value Creation, PhD Microeconomics, PhD Industrial Organization, MSc Topics in Industrial Organization, MSc Antirust Economics and Competition Policy
  • Kellogg: MBA Strategy and Organization

Research Interest

Industrial Organization, Competition Policy, Dynamic Games, Applied Microeconomic Theory

Selected Publications

  • “The Identification of Unobservable Independent and Spousal Leisure”, (with Junsen Zhang), Journal of Political Economy 109 (1), February 2001, 191-202.
  • “When do Experts Cheat and Whom do They Target?”, RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (1), Spring 2005, 113-130.
  • “Compensation for Quality Difference in a Search Model of Money”, (with Balázs Szentes), International Economic Review, 46 (3), August 2005, 957-971.
  • “On the Optimal Degree of Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Side Payments”, (with Jay Surti), Games and Economic Behavior, September 2009, 67 (1), 277–291.
  • “Private Information of Nonpaternalistic Altruism: Exaggeration of Generosity and Reciprocal Behavior”, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances), 9(1), 2009, Article 1. (One of two finalists, 2008 Arrow Prize for Junior Economists)
  • “Bidding in a Possibly Common-Value Auction”, (with Daniel F. Garrett), Note, Games and Economic Behavior, 70 (2), November 2010, 494-501.
  • “Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion”, (with Qihong Liu), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 20 (3), Fall 2011, 739–775.
  • “Product Quality, Reputation, and Market Structure”, (with Jim Dana), International Economic Review, November 2011, 52(4), 1059–1076.
  • “Long-lived Consumers, Intertemporal Bundling and Collusion”, (with Jim Dana), The Journal of Industrial Economics, December 2011, 59(4), 609–629.
  • “On the Role of Verifiability and Commitment in Credence Goods Markets”, (with Ting Liu and Donald J. Wright), International Journal of Industrial Organization, November 2014, 37, 118-129.
  • “When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition”, (with Jin Li and Ke Liu), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Winter 2016, 25(4), 852–879.
  • “Information Revelation in Relational Contracts”, (with Jin Li), The Review of Economic Studies, January 2017, 84 (1), 277–299.
  • “Relational Contracts, Limited Liability, and Employment Dynamics”, (with Jin Li), Journal of Economic Theory, May 2017, 169, 270-293.
  • “Signaling by an Informed Service Provider”, (with Frances Xu Lee),  Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Winter 2017, 26 (4), 955-968.
  • “Liability and Reputation in Credence Goods Markets”, (with Ting Liu), Economics Letters, May 2018, 166, 35-39.
  • “Using Customer Service to Build Clients’ Trust”, (with Xiaoxiao Hu, Ting Liu and Xiaoxuan Meng), The Journal of Industrial Economics, March 2020, 68 (1), 136-155.
  • “Negotiated Block Trade and Rebuilding of Trust”, (with Pak Hung Au and Jin Li), International Economic Review, May 2020, 61(2), 901-939.
  • “Trust Building in Credence Goods Markets”, (with Xiaoxuan Meng and Ting Liu), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.

Service to the University/Community

  • Editor, B.E. Journals of Theoretical Economics, 2012- (Associate Editor, 2006-2012)
  • Associate Editor, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009-
  • Associate Editor, Taiwan Economic Review, 2012-2014
  • Director, Center for Experimental Business Research, HKUST, 2013-2018
  • Nominator, China Economic Prize, for National Economic Foundation, China, 2016, 2017, 2018
  • Co-chair, 12th Workshop on Industrial Organization and Management Strategy, 2016
  • Chair, HKUST Workshop on Industrial Organization, 2017, 2018
  • Executive Committee Member, Hong Kong Economic Association, 2017-
  • Advisory Committee Member, Curriculum Development Council and Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority Committee on Economics (Senior Secondary), 2013 –2017.
  • Advisory Committee Member, Diploma of Secondary Education Economics Subject Committee in 2013-2015.

Recent Publications

How HKU Business School builds mutually beneficial partnerships with employers

The HKU Business School - MBA Career Development and Training (CDT) team hosted the highly successful and well received inaugural HR Leaders Forum, with the participation of industry experts, scholars, and more than 50 HR practitioners from large corporates.

The powerful platform business model

在全球市值前十的公司中,有六家是平台公司,包括蘋果(Apple Inc.)、微軟(Microsoft Corporation)、亞馬遜(Amazon.com)、Alphabet(谷歌的母公司)、Facebook和阿里巴巴。平台商業模式如此強大,主要是由於其網絡效應。

The powerful platform business model

在全球市值前十的公司中,有六家是平台公司,包括蘋果(Apple Inc.)、微軟(Microsoft Corporation)、亞馬遜(Amazon.com)、Alphabet(谷歌的母公司)、Facebook和阿里巴巴。平台商業模式如此強大,主要是由於其網絡效應。

疫市數碼轉型 HR責任擴大遇難題

新冠肺炎疫情驅動下,數碼時代變革加速。作為傳統行業的人力資源管理(HR),也正面臨着轉型升級的趨勢,無論是招聘渠道與面試方法、或是日常辦公以及培訓模式,均正逐步轉變。

Eliminate Covid-19 from economic perspectives

疫情已經肆虐了一段時間。儘管部分國家和地區的新增感染個案下降,但仍然有部分國家和地區的形勢令人擔憂。若要復甦經濟和消滅病毒,我們必須依靠疫苗。僅靠戴口罩和保持社交距離來壓制病毒的傳播,既不現實,也難以讓市民無限期接受。

Eliminate Covid-19 from economic perspectives

疫情已經肆虐了一段時間。儘管部分國家和地區的新增感染個案下降,但仍然有部分國家和地區的形勢令人擔憂。若要復甦經濟和消滅病毒,我們必須依靠疫苗。僅靠戴口罩和保持社交距離來壓制病毒的傳播,既不現實,也難以讓市民無限期接受。

Potential anti-competitive effects of algorithmic pricing

疫情肆虐加速普羅大眾把購物習慣從線下轉向線上。根據IBM美國零售指數的最新數據,冠狀病毒大流行讓零售業從實體店轉向網上購物的進程提早了約5年;經濟合作暨發展組織(OECD)的報告也指出:疫情正在加快電子商務平台向新的客戶和產品擴展速度。毋庸置疑,進程產生好處:企業從實體經營轉向線上業務時,降低了成本,同時提高了生產效率。但若要確保消費者能從中受益,線上平台所處的經營環境應該保持競爭性。能否維持這一點,未來仍存在不少變數,其中讓人擔心的是,以機器學習為核心的定價算法可能對營商環境的競爭帶來潛在負面影響。

The future of robotics, AI and employment

The article 《機械人技術 人工智能和就業的未來》 was originally published in Hong Kong Economic Journal column 「龍虎山下」

Everyone can win in business – or can they?

‘Workers against bosses’ is a common theme, but mutual interest is more important in creating value, according to HKU Business School professors.

The pandemic’s impact on education quality and equality

經濟學家普遍認為,教育對經濟增長和發展具有積極影響。在個人層面上,教育可以提高個人的生產力和收入。同時,教育對社會有正外部性經濟效應:除了享有更高個人收入,受過良好教育的經理和企業家可以幫助公司發展業務,創造更多就業機會,並且給股東帶來更高的回報;訓練有素的醫生可以挽救更多生命;精通法律的律師可以更好地維護社會公義;博學又尊業的老師能夠更好地傳授知識;擁有前沿知識的科學家和工程師將帶動更多的創新,進而促進經濟發展。

Blue ocean strategy against coronavirus crisis

新冠肺炎已經感染了410萬人口,並且導致28萬人喪生。相對於其他地區,香港的感染和死亡人數顯著較低。截至5月11日,已經連續22天沒有新增本地傳染個案了。

Negotiated Block Trade and Rebuilding of Trust

We investigate the impact of corporate governance on customers' trust using a dynamic model of experience‐goods firm. In the optimal equilibrium, customers' trust in the firm is linked to its behavior in the market for corporate control, so that the controlling shareholder has incentives to ensure high product quality while noncontrolling shareholders' interests are protected. Following a trust‐damaging event, turnover of the controlling share block restores customers' trust and enhances total shareholder value. Our analysis identifies an endogenous cost of corporate control, offers implications for the control premium, and provides a novel rationale for the separation of ownership and control.

Price hikes and panic buying amid coronavirus outbreak

目前新型冠狀肺炎全球肆虐,之前部分防疫物資,例如外科手術口罩、防護衣等短缺。市民大眾囤積大米、廁紙等生活必需品,不同媒體(包括BBC)就曾報道,此等囤積行為愚蠢、不理性。部分商店亦趁機抬高相關物品價格,一盒50個口罩售價曾暴升至380元【註】。有人提議政府應盡快立法,限制防疫物資價格上漲,有人則持相反意見;

Using Customer Service to Build Clients’ Trust

It is well known in the credence‐good literature that in an expert‐client relationship, under the Liability assumptions, clients have to reject the expert’s serious‐treatment recommendations with a positive probability to ensure that the expert honestly recommends treatments. Inefficiency arises because some socially efficient treatments are not provided. We show that the expert can enhance clients’ trust, or acceptance rate of the serious treatment, by providing intrinsically socially inefficient customer service upon recommending the serious treatment. Enhanced clients’ trust leads to higher efficiency and higher profit for the expert. However, trust cannot be enhanced by providing customer service with different timing.

How to choose the best MBA

Article by Prof. Yuk-fai FONG, Associate Dean (Taught Postgraduate)