Lin Qiu
Dr. Lin QIU
Accounting and Law
Assistant Professor

3917 0018

KK 1210

Academic & Professional Qualification

New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business
Ph.D. in Accounting

Peking University, Guanghua School of Management
M.A. in Economics

Peking University, Guanghua School of Management
B.A. in Economics, B.S. in Statistics


Lin Qiu received her Ph.D. in Accounting from New York University, M.A in economics and B.A. in economics from Guanghua School of Business, Peking University. Her analytical work has focused on corporate governance, specifically, on the role of the board. Her work has been published in The Accounting Review.


Principles of Financial Accounting – Undergraduate, New York University

Research Interest
  • Corporate Governance
  • Financial Accounting
  • Strategic Information Transmission
Selected Publications
  • “The Value of Board Commitment”, with Tim Baldenius and Xiaojing Meng. Review of Accounting Studies, 2021, 26 (4), 1587-1622.
  • “Biased Boards”, with Tim Baldenius and Xiaojing Meng. The Accounting Review, 2019, 94 (2), 1-27.
Awards and Honours

2018 Jules Bogen Fellowship, NYU Stern School of Business

2013-2017 Doctoral Fellowship, NYU Stern School of Business

Recent Publications
Beyond Book-keeping: Dr. Lin QIU

Dr. Qiu is a novice scholar. Her interests in corporate governance could help students to dive deeper in the ocean of accounting.

Biased Boards

We study a corporate board tasked with monitoring a firm’s CEO and providing incrementally decision relevant information. The board has both compensation and non-pecuniary incentives—we label the latter board bias. Friendly boards have muted information gathering incentives, but can more effectively engage in cheap talk communication with management. As a result, the direction of the optimal board bias is determined by the CEO’s initial information advantage: the board should be weakly friendly if the CEO is endowed with precise information, and weakly antagonistic (to the CEO) otherwise. Aside from assembling a friendly board, another way for shareholders to foster CEO/board communication is by granting the CEO more equity. In general, we find board friendliness and CEO equity grants to be positively associated, in equilibrium. This provides an optimal contracting rationale for an empirical regularity often interpreted as friendly boards facilitating rent extraction.