Dr. Qiu is a novice scholar. Her interests in corporate governance could help students to dive deeper in the ocean of accounting.
13 Jan 2020
Dr. Lin QIU
Accounting and Law
Assistant Professor
3917 0018
KK 1210
Academic & Professional Qualification
New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business
Ph.D. in Accounting
Peking University, Guanghua School of Management
M.A. in Economics
Peking University, Guanghua School of Management
B.A. in Economics, B.S. in Statistics
Biography
Lin Qiu received her Ph.D. in Accounting from New York University, M.A in economics and B.A. in economics from Guanghua School of Business, Peking University. Her analytical work has focused on corporate governance, specifically, on the role of the board. Her work has been published in The Accounting Review.
Teaching
Principles of Financial Accounting – Undergraduate, New York University
Research Interest
- Corporate Governance
- Financial Accounting
- Strategic Information Transmission
Selected Publications
- “The Value of Board Commitment”, with Tim Baldenius and Xiaojing Meng. Review of Accounting Studies, 2021, 26 (4), 1587-1622.
- “Biased Boards”, with Tim Baldenius and Xiaojing Meng. The Accounting Review, 2019, 94 (2), 1-27.
Awards and Honours
2018 Jules Bogen Fellowship, NYU Stern School of Business
2013-2017 Doctoral Fellowship, NYU Stern School of Business
Recent Publications
13Jan
1Mar
We study a corporate board tasked with monitoring a firm’s CEO and providing incrementally decision relevant information. The board has both compensation and non-pecuniary incentives—we label the latter board bias. Friendly boards have muted information gathering incentives, but can more effectively engage in cheap talk communication with management. As a result, the direction of the optimal board bias is determined by the CEO’s initial information advantage: the board should be weakly friendly if the CEO is endowed with precise information, and weakly antagonistic (to the CEO) otherwise. Aside from assembling a friendly board, another way for shareholders to foster CEO/board communication is by granting the CEO more equity. In general, we find board friendliness and CEO equity grants to be positively associated, in equilibrium. This provides an optimal contracting rationale for an empirical regularity often interpreted as friendly boards facilitating rent extraction.
1 Mar 2019
The Accounting Review