Protectionism, Global Supply Chains, and Political Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S.–China Trade War
Mr. Bo Yang
Ph.D. Candidate in Strategy, International Business
Marshall School of Business
University of Southern California
ABSTRACT
This study examines how firms integrate political strategy with supply chain strategy to address protectionism within the context of the United States–China trade war. By assembling firm-level data on political lobbying, global supply chains, and international shipping, I find that U.S. firms exposed to U.S. tariff actions increased their domestic lobbying to influence the formulation and implementation of relevant trade policies. Firms’ lobbying activities were influenced by their preexisting market strategies—those impacted lobbied more intensively if they sourced more specialized inputs from China or had made greater commitments to the Chinese market. Firms’ lobbying efforts also facilitated their concurrent supply chain strategies: firms that lobbied engaged more actively in precautionary stockpiling and diversifying supply chains from China, reflecting the information advantages of lobbying.
