Media Avoidance and Corporate Disclosure
Prof. Yuan Zhang
Albert Lepage Professor of Accounting
Freeman School of Business
Tulane University
This study examines firms’ explicit avoidance of media in corporate conference presentations and their corresponding disclosure strategy. We find that firms with negative media coverage and higher institutional ownership are more likely to avoid the media. Their conference presentations feature greater executive participation and more detailed financial content, and result in an improved information environment characterized by lower return volatility and narrower bid-ask spreads. Analysts respond more quickly to these anti-media presentations, which contributes to the observed market effects. In a supplementary analysis of conference calls where journalists are permitted to attend and ask questions, we show that journalists’ questions are shorter, more ESG-focused, and more negative in tone than those from analysts, reflecting distinct information demands. These differences help explain why managers with specific incentives engage selectively with media versus analysts. Overall, the findings indicate that firms recognize the differences among information intermediaries and adopt selective media engagement to shape the corporate information environment and capital market outcomes.













