Matching job applicants to vacancies: An empirical model
Prof. Robert A. Miller
Professor of Economics and Strategy
Carnegie Mellon University
We use data on all job applications and labor market outcomes within a large firm over a 5 year period to learn about how the search and matching process affects worker outcomes. To do this, we develop and estimate a two sided search and matching model, in which positions become vacant when the current occupant of the job leaves, the firm begins a search process by advertising the position, and workers employed both inside and outside the organization apply for the newly vacated position. Hiring is multistage, where various employees with differing objectives cull applicants through a process that leads the stakeholders to become more informed about the potential job matches. After estimating the model, we use counterfactuals to understand how multistage choice affects the selection of the hired worker from a given set of applicants, and explore how outcomes would vary with other mechanisms. We also use the model to explore how differences in hiring outcomes across racial groups and gender would be impacted under different hiring rules.