Lynn Linghuan WANG
Prof. Lynn Linghuan WANG
Accounting and Law
Assistant Professor

3910 3080

KK 1306

Academic & Professional Qualification
  • Ph.D in Accounting, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
  • M.S. in Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong
  • M.A. in Finance, Peking University (Dual master program)
  • B.A. in Economics and Finance, University of International Business and Economics
Biography

Dr. Wang joined the HKU Business School in July 2022. Her research area is in the field of empirical financial accounting with a focus on the real effects of non-financial disclosure regulation and bank accounting. She previously held academic position at Bocconi University. She was a visiting scholar at the University of Cologne in 2014 and Michigan Ross in 2020.

Teaching
  • Introduction to Financial Accounting (ACCT1101)
  • ESG reporting: Concepts and Practices (MACC7024/PMGM7035)
Research Interest
  • Disclosure and Accounting Regulation
  • Financial Institutions
  • Bank Accounting
  • Debt Contracting
  • ESG
Awards and Honours
  • Best CSR Paper Award, AFAANZ Annual Conference, 2024
  • Best Paper Award, MIT Asia Conference in Accounting, 2021
  • Outstanding Reviewer Award, Joint AAA IAS/IAAER Midyear Meeting, 2021
  • Dean’s Ph.D. Fellowship for Research Excellence, HKUST, 2020 – 2021
  • Hong Kong Ph.D. Fellowship (HKPFS), HKUST, 2016 – 2020
  • FARS Doctoral Consortium Fellow, 2020
Selected Publications
  • “Do Depositors Respond to Banks’ Social Performance?”, co-authored with Yi-Chun Chen and Mingyi Hung, The Accounting Review, 2023, 98(4): 89-114
    (https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2019-0653)
  • “Learning from Peers: Evidence from Disclosure of Consumer Complaints,” co-authored with Yiwei Dou, Mingyi Hung and Guoman She, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2024, 77(2-3), 101620.
    (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101620)
  • “Firm Boundaries and Voluntary Disclosure,” co-authored with Thomas Bourveau, John D. Kepler and Guoman She, The Accounting Review, 2024, 99(4): 111–141.
    (https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2022-0182)
Service to the University/Community
  • Editorial Board: European Accounting Review, 2024 –
  • Ad-hoc reviewer service for academic journals: Journal of Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, Management Science, etc.
Recent Publications
Firm Boundaries and Voluntary Disclosure

We study how vertical integration shapes firms’ public disclosures. Theory suggests that firms can use public disclosure to coordinate with supply chain partners and predicts a substitution between vertical integration and public disclosure of future strategic plans, since the internalization of production reduces the need to publicly coordinate. Using data on the extent of vertical integration, we find that firms that become more vertically integrated reduce their public disclosures about their product strategies and that the reduction is most pronounced for vertically integrated firms with greater internalization of production and those with the largest informational and strategic frictions along the supply chain.

Learning from peers: Evidence from disclosure of consumer complaints

In 2013, the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released a database of consumer complaints filed against banks under its supervision (“CFPB banks”). We find that after the disclosure, rival banks exhibit a greater increase in mortgage approval rates in markets with more intensive mortgage complaints about CFPB banks. The effect is weaker when rivals have more expertise in the local market, are less concerned about credit risk due to mortgage sales, and locate in areas with more alternative information about the CFPB banks. The effect is concentrated in severe complaints and complaints related to loan underwriting practices. In addition to approving more loans, rivals also open more branches and are more likely to post a job opening in these markets. The findings suggest that these banks learn from the nonfinancial disclosures about operational deficiencies of peers (i.e., CFPB banks) in local markets, which alleviates their adverse selection concern about expanding.

Do Depositors Respond to Banks’ Social Performance?

We study whether and how banks’ social performance affects depositors, who hold demandable debt with pervasive government protection. Exploiting the regulatory releases of bank performance ratings for community development and a difference-in-differences design, we find a decline in deposit growth after the release of negative bank social performance. In addition, deposits that are impacted by the negative events flow to nearby banks with high social performance. Further analyses find that the results hold similarly among insured and uninsured deposits and are primarily driven by banks with a large proportion of deposits from high-trust and pro-social counties, and in poor information environments. Overall, we contribute to the literature by documenting the importance of social performance to nonshareholder stakeholders and providing implications for bank stability.

Transmission Effects of ESG Disclosure Regulations Through Bank Lending Networks

This paper studies whether and how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations imposed on banks generate transmission effects along the lending channel. I use a setting of U.S. firms borrowing from non-U.S. banks and exploit the staggered adoption of ESG disclosure regulations in banks’ home countries. I find that exposed borrowers of affected banks improve their environmental and social (E&S) performance following the disclosure mandate. Consistent with banks enhancing both their engagement and selection activities, affected banks impose more environmental action covenants in loan contracts, and they are more likely to terminate a borrower with bad E&S records following the regulation. Further evidence shows that the transmission effects are stronger when a disclosure regulation is well-enforced (as indicated by a greater increase in banks’ disclosure) and among borrowers with greater switching costs. Collectively, the findings document the role of lending relationships in transmitting the real effect of ESG disclosure regulations from banks to borrowing firms.