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Credit default swaps (CDSs) are a major financial innovation related to debt contracting. Because CDS markets facilitate bad news being incorporated into equity prices via cross-market information spillover, CDS availability may curb firms’ information hoarding. We find that CDS trading on a firm’s debt reduces the future stock price crash risk. This effect is stronger in active CDS markets, when the main lenders are CDS market dealers with securities trading subsidiaries, or when managers have more motivation to hoard information. Our findings suggest that debt market financial innovations curtail the negative equity market effects of firms withholding bad news.

International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 is of practical relevance to banks because it requires intense monitoring of borrowers to record timely loan losses. Using data from 50 countries, we find that accounting-driven bank monitoring due to IFRS 9 adoption reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt relative to public debt. This finding is consistent with firms experiencing more costly bank monitoring after a shift in regulatory reporting that requires banks to monitor borrowers more intensely. In further analyses, we find that the negative effect of IFRS 9 adoption on bank debt reliance is more pronounced with more stringent regulatory supervision of banks, consistent with regulatory stringency exacerbating costly bank monitoring for firms. We also find that the negative effect is stronger when firms can more easily switch from bank debt to public debt financing, consistent with the relevance of switching costs in firms’ decisions to avoid costly bank monitoring.

Customer referencing is a strategy that firms can use to disclose their connections with reputable customers as a means of enhancing their own reputations. We study the capital market benefits of naming reputable nonmajor customers in firms' financial reports to provide empirical evidence on whether this form of customer referencing has important practical implications. We predict and find that firms enjoy a lower cost of equity when they engage in customer referencing in their financial reports, consistent with the argument that this form of voluntary disclosure increases investor attention and customer certification. In cross-sectional analyses, we predict and find that the benefits of customer referencing are more pronounced for firms that (1) lack major customers or reputable major customers, (2) name customers whose reputations exceed their own, and (3) face higher competition. Overall, our study provides evidence that communicating certain interorganizational connections can generate capital market benefits for disclosing firms.