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We examine changes in bank loan contracts after borrowers experience a nearby local newspaper closure. Compared to a sample of control firms, we find that the closure of a local newspaper leads to higher interest spreads for borrowers. This effect is more pronounced when there are fewer related lenders in the syndicate, when lenders have less prior lending experience in the local area, when the closed local newspapers are associated with increases in misconduct cases, and for institutional lenders who rely more heavily on others for monitoring. In addition, we observe that loan contract amendments become less frequent, while covenant strictness increases following newspaper closures. Our main findings are robust to various research design specifications and are not driven by deteriorating local economic conditions. Our findings suggest that local media still plays a significant role in the debt markets, even as society moves deeper into the internet era.

We study how proprietary information flows in strategic alliances facilitate banks’ information collection in private debt markets. We argue that lenders that have previously worked with a borrower’s alliance partners have an information advantage and show that firms entering a strategic alliance receive a lower interest spread on loans from banks that have previously lent to their strategic partners than loans from other banks. Cross-sectional tests on alliances’ economic importance and participants’ information environment support our hypothesis that the loan price effect is driven by reduced information asymmetry between borrowers and their partners’ relationship banks. Last, we find borrowers are more likely to obtain debt financing from alliance-related banks than from other banks. Overall, our findings are consistent with lenders that have previously worked with an alliance counterparty possessing debt contracting-relevant information about the soft nature of alliance value and the partners’ commitment to alliances.

We show that managers have a propensity to disproportionately report total revenues just above base-ten thresholds (e.g., 10 million, 30 million, 1 billion) and examine motives for and consequences of this behavior. Focusing on base-ten thresholds in revenues is important because, despite being unusually prevalent in revenue targets set in executive compensation contracts, analyst forecasts, and management forecasts, they have not been previously explored. We also show that pressure to beat these targets provides one explanation for the base-ten bias in reported revenues. However, these incentive effects do not offer a complete explanation because base-ten threshold-beating is observed even in the absence of these explicit targets. We further find that when firms beat a base-ten threshold for the first time, they experience increases in news coverage, institutional ownership, liquidity, and analyst following, even after controlling for whether they have beaten other common benchmarks. These results suggest that managers also beat base-ten thresholds in order to increase their firms' overall visibility. Overall, we show that a preference for base-ten numbers, which have no inherent economic meaning, has a measurable effect on the actions of market participants. These results open the door to a new range of managerial targets previously unexplored.