“Unison of Knowing and Doing and the Paradox of Management Research” by Professor Hao Ma

Speaker:

Professor Hao Ma
Professor of Management
National School of Development
Peking University

 

Abstract:

This research provides a broad-brushed account on the paradoxical nature of management research in its seeking for both theoretical rigor and practical relevance. Specifically, it focuses on the dissection and critique of the so called “unison of knowing and doing” (知行合一). Such unison or oneness promises to be an ideal situation desired by the intelligentsia in general and, supposedly, by management decision makers in particular. This is especially so in China where the intelligentsia prides itself in self-reflection and pursuit of informed life and career. However, despite the fanciness and allure of the unison ideal, neither has its definition been accurately specified nor its measures actually operationalized. Theorists and practitioners alike remain confused and perplexed regarding its interpretation and practice. Based loosely on the literature in the mainstream management research community, this research attempts to come up with a working definition for such a unison, explore its paradoxical nature and underlying tensions, and raise a series of research questions if scholarly efforts are to be applied toward this topic and phenomenon.
Building on the basic premise of bounded rationality, it argues that unison of knowing and doing is but an ideal, unattainable and unnecessary to most people under most situations, except for craftsmanship in repeated tasks and project management in predictable and stable environment. In their often hectic daily grinding, management practitioners usually do not have the luxury to engage in reflective thinking and deep learning. Most likely, they have to act “thinkingly” and improvise accordingly so as to effectively cope with the incessant changes and challenges in the increasingly complex and uncertain world, given the unavoidable gap between knowing and doing.

Read More

“Too Much of a Good Thing? Labor Market Imperfections as a Source of Exceptional Exporter Performance” by Prof. Carsten Eckel

Management and Strategy Seminar

Speaker:

Prof. Carsten Eckel
Chair of International Trade and Trade Policy
Faculty of Economics
University of Munich

Abstract:

International trade is primarily conducted by large, multiproduct firms (MPFs) that pay above average wages and exhibit high productivity.  In this paper we show that if firms can invest in management technologies for identifying worker skill then they will enjoy a form of market power in the labor market that artificially lowers their labor costs.  This market failure results in excessive consumption of resources by large, productive exporting firms relative to the social optimum. Trade liberalization then has an ambiguous effect on aggregate welfare: lower trade costs increase access to foreign goods but also exacerbates the labor market distortion as resources are transferred to large firms. The model highlights the need to know why firms “excel” before drawing welfare conclusions regarding cross firm reallocations of resources.

(joint with Steve Yeaple)

Read More

“Good Deeds Done in Silence: Legitimacy Management, Stakeholder Conflict, and Quiet Giving by Chinese Firms” by Professor Heli Wang

Management and Strategy Seminar

Speaker:

Professor Heli Wang
Professor of Strategic Management
Lee Kong Chian School of Business
Singapore Management University

Abstract:

Corporate philanthropy generally has a positive effect on firm image and reputation. Building on and extending the stakeholder-management and legitimacy literature, we argue that concerns about stakeholder backlash may cause firms to keep quiet about their philanthropic acts. In particular, we argue that negative reactions to a firm’s philanthropy are likely attributable to primary stakeholders that feel the firm is not meeting their legitimate claims. Conversely, community stakeholders are likely to have positive perceptions of philanthropy that helps mitigate their existing concerns. Using data from listed Chinese firms, we show that firms are more likely to give quietly when they underpay employees and investors. On the other hand, firms that mistreat community stakeholders are less likely to keep quiet about their donations.

 

Read More

“Acquirers’ Board Interlocks Behind Mergers And Acquisitions” by Ms. Joyce C. Wang

Management and Strategy Seminar

Speaker:

Ms. Joyce C. Wang
Ph.D. Candidate in International Management Studies
Jindal School of Management
University of Texas at Dallas

Abstract:

This paper extends research on the strategic implications of boards of directors to those of board interlocks, which are considered either as sources of relational capital stemming from interfirm ties or as sources of inefficiencies due to directors’ multiple directorships. This implies that board interlocks may positively or negatively affect firm strategies. We reconcile the diverging views by proposing that they pertain to different facets of board interlocks.
Specifically, a relational capital lens emphasizes opportunity identification, whereas a multiple directorship lens stresses opportunity realization. We test the distinction by investigating how firms grow via mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Leveraging a sample of M&As in the United States, we find that acquirers with more board interlocks are associated with more acquisition announcements (opportunity identification), but with a lower likelihood of acquisition completion (opportunity realization). In addition, we explore two contingencies: (1) interlocking directorship composition and (2) CEO-board power dynamics. Overall, our findings highlight a balanced view towards the strategic implications of board interlocks.

 

Read More

“CEO Career Variety and Firm Risk Management Capabilities” by Dr. Philipp Meyer-Doyle

Management and Strategy Seminar

Speaker:

  • Dr. Philipp Meyer-Doyle
    Assistant Professor of Strategy
    INSEAD – Singapore

Abstract:

We explore how the prior career variety of a CEO shapes the CEO’s capacity to successfully manage risk. Making use of microdata on CEOs and firms, we find that CEOs with a greater career variety, in terms of the number of industries, firms, and functional positions they have worked in, achieve a lower variability of firm performance and a higher firm performance, both adjusted for risk taking; they also engage in greater levels of risk taking. Interestingly, these results weaken with longer CEO tenure in the firm. Taken together, these results suggest that CEO career variety is an important factor contributing to a CEO’s capacity to manage risk in firms. Overall, we contribute to the literatures on strategic leadership and on risk in strategic management.

Read More