The scalability of a marketplace depends on the operations of the marketplace platform and its sellers’ capacities. In this study, we explore one strategy that a marketplace platform can use to enhance its scalability: providing an ancillary service to sellers. In our model, a platform can choose whether and when to provide this service to sellers and, if so, what prices to charge and which types of sellers to serve. Although such a service helps small sellers, we highlight that the provision of such a service can diminish the incentives of large sellers to make their own investment, thereby reducing their potential output. When the output reduction by large sellers is substantial, the platform may not want to provide the ancillary service, and, even if it does, it may choose to set a price higher than its marginal cost to motivate large sellers to scale. The platform may also choose to strategically delay the provision of the service.
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We present a novel explanation of why organizations tend to lose their agility over time despite their efforts to foster worker initiative in adapting to local information. Worker initiative ensures efficiency but requires strong incentives. When incentives are relational and the firm faces shocks to its credibility, it may adopt standardized work processes that ignore local information but yield satisfactory (though suboptimal) performance. The adoption of such standardized processes helps the firm survive the current shock but inflicts inefficiencies in the future. Although the firm may recover, it becomes more vulnerable to future shocks, and consequently, more reliant on the standardized work procedures.
We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. We show that the proof-of-work system may lead to a situation in which some large firms in the blockchain industrial ecosystem—blockchain conglomerates—capture the governance of the blockchain.
无论是投资者或是经营者，都希望自己参与的企业在市场竞争中立于不败之地。一间公司的内在价值，取决于其维持自由现金流的能力。能做到历久不衰、长期获利的企业，通常都具备可持续竞争优势（sustainable competitive advantage），也就是毕非德（Warren Buffett）口中的「经济护城河」（economic moat）。
无论是投资者或是经营者，都希望自己参与的企业在市场竞争中立于不败之地。一间公司的内在价值，取决于其维持自由现金流的能力。能做到历久不衰、长期获利的企业，通常都具备可持续竞争优势（sustainable competitive advantage），也就是毕非德（Warren Buffett）口中的「经济护城河」（economic moat）。
今年哈佛大学的毕业典礼上，校长巴科（Lawrence Bacow）提到由于受疫情和供应链影响，校内折椅短缺，要不是员工足智多谋，可能一半毕业生得坐在地上。巴科以椅子作为比喻，目的是向毕业生提出希望和挑战。
今年哈佛大学的毕业典礼上，校长巴科（Lawrence Bacow）提到由于受疫情和供应链影响，校内折椅短缺，要不是员工足智多谋，可能一半毕业生得坐在地上。巴科以椅子作为比喻，目的是向毕业生提出希望和挑战。
这项研究指出公司的债务会削弱员工相关奖励及损害士气。我们建立了一个动态模型，研究一名经理运用有限的财政资源，同时向债权人还款及激励员工士气。若该名经理可以转移或不正当地使用公司收入，公司的债务会减低员工达成既定奖励目标的意欲，导致其工作效率降低。在平均利润最大化的情况下，公司按优次偿还债务，使员工的工作效率及工资逐步提升。即使公司已完全还清债务，此动态仍会持续。此外，我们发现一间公司的财务杠杆与激励员工士气的措施、工资及生产力属反比关联，这与动态模型的分析相符。
网上流传这样一条选择题：「疫情过后，谁在主导你公司业务的数码转型？」答案并非行政总裁或技术总监，而是2019冠状病毒。这个答案虽听上去颇具玩笑意味，但却甚具现实意义。