Jin Li
Prof. Jin LI
經濟學
管理及商業策略
Professor
Area Head of Management and Strategy

3917 0056

KK 936

Academic & Professional Qualification
  • PhD: MIT
  • Bachelor: Caltech (B.S) and Wesleyan University (B.A.)
Biography

Jin Li is a professor of management and strategy, with joint appointment in economics at Hong Kong University. Prior to HKU, he has taught at Kellogg School of Management and London School of Economics, where he was a tenured associate professor of managerial economics and strategy. During his tenure at LSE, Professor Li won the Management Department teaching prize.

Professor Li’s main research area lies at the intersection of organizational economics, personnel economics, and labor economics. It focuses on the dynamics of informal relationships and explores how firms can design organizations to align incentives and build trust. This research sheds light on how organizational design can be a source of competitive advantage. Recently, Professor Li has studied topics on the digital economy including causality issues in machine learning algorithms and governance of blockchain.

Professor Li has published in leading academic journals such as the American Economic Review, the Review of Economic Studies, AEJ- Microeconomics, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Labor Economics, and the RAND Journal of Economics. His works have also been featured in media outlets such as the BBC, the Economist, and Quartz, and he has written for Harvard Business Review, Caixin, and FTChinese.

Professor Li earned his BA in economics and math (with high honors) from Wesleyan University, a BSc in applied math (with honors) from Caltech, and PhD in Economics from MIT.

Teaching
  • Personnel Strategy for MBAs (Kellogg)
  • Strategy and Organization for MBAs (Kellogg)
  • Economics of Organization for PhDs (Kellogg)
  • Incentives and Governance in Organizations for Masters (LSE)
  • Capstone Project for MBAs (HKU)
Research Interest
  • Organizational Economics
  • Personnel Economics
  • Labor Economics
Selected Publications
  • “Tacit Collusion in Auctions and Conditions for Its Facilitation and Prevention: Equilibrium Selection in Laboratory Experimental Markets,” (with Charles Plott), Economic Inquiry, Vol 47, No.3, (July 2009) pp. 425-448.
  • “Job Mobility, Wage Dispersion, and Technological Change: An Asymmetric Information Perspective,” European Economic Review Vol 60, (May, 2013) pp. 105-126.
  • “Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts,”
    (with Niko Matouschek), American Economic Review, Vol 103, No.6 (October, 2013) pp. 2328-51.
  • “Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations”
    (with Joyee Deb and Arijit Mukherjee), Rand Journal of Economics, Vol 47, No. 1 (Spring, 2016) pp. 3-28 (Lead Article).
  • “When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition?”
    (with Yuk-Fai Fong and Ke Liu), Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol 25, No.4 (Winter, 2016) pp. 852-879.
  • “Information Revelation in Relational Contracts”
    (with Yuk-Fai Fong), Review of Economic Studies, Vol 84 No. 1 (Jan 2017) pp. 277-299.
  • “A Theory of Turnover and Wage Dynamics,”
    (with Jun Yu), Economic Inquiry, Vol 55, No. 1 (Jan, 2017) pp. 223-236.
  • “Power Dynamics in Organizations,”
    (with Niko Matouschek and Mike Powell), AEJ Micro, Vol 9, No. 1 (Feb, 2017) pp. 217-241.
  • “Relational Contracts, Limited Liability, and Employment Dynamics”
    (with Yuk-Fai Fong), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 169 (May, 2017), pp. 270-293.
  • “Managing Careers in Organizations”
    (with Rongzhu Ke and Mike Powell), Journal of Labor Economics, Vol 36, No. 1 (Jan, 2018) pp. 197-252.
  • “Multilateral Interactions Improve Cooperation under Random Fluctuations”
    (with Michael Powell), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 119 (Jan, 2020) pp. 358-382.
  • “Negotiated Block Trade and Rebuilding of Trust”
    (with Pak Hung Au and Yuk‐Fai Fong), International Economic Review, Vol 61, No. 2 (May, 2020) pp. 901-939.
  • “Learning to Game the System”
    (with Arijit Mukherjee and Luis Vasconcelos), Review of Economic Studies, Vol 88, No. 4 (July, 2021) pp. 2014-2041.
  • “Morale and Debt Dynamics”
    (with Daniel Barron and Michał Zator), Management Science, Vol 68, No. 6 (June, 2022) pp. 4496-4516.
  • “Optimal Subjective Contracting with Revision”
    (with Xinhao He and Zhaoneng Yuan), Management Science, forthcoming.
Service to the University/Community

Professor Li has acted as a reviewer for 30 journals, including AER, Econometrica, JPE, QJE, and ReStud. He has also reviewed grant proposals for the National Science Foundation of the U.S. (NSF) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). Professor Li served as an external PhD examiner for the Norwegian School of Economics.

Recent Publications
椅子經濟學:內捲、躺平和機會管理

今年哈佛大學的畢業典禮上,校長巴科(Lawrence Bacow)提到由於受疫情和供應鏈影響,校內摺椅短缺,要不是員工足智多謀,可能一半畢業生得坐在地上。巴科以椅子作為比喻,目的是向畢業生提出希望和挑戰。

椅子經濟學:內捲、躺平和機會管理

今年哈佛大學的畢業典禮上,校長巴科(Lawrence Bacow)提到由於受疫情和供應鏈影響,校內摺椅短缺,要不是員工足智多謀,可能一半畢業生得坐在地上。巴科以椅子作為比喻,目的是向畢業生提出希望和挑戰。

Morale and Debt Dynamics

This paper shows that debt undermines relational incentives and harms worker morale. We build a dynamic model of a manager who uses limited financial resources to simultaneously repay a creditor and motivate a worker. If the manager can divert or misuse revenue, then debt makes the manager less willing to follow through on promised rewards, leading to low worker effort. In profit-maximizing equilibria, the firm prioritizes repaying its debts, leading to gradual increases in effort and wages. These dynamics can persist even after debts have been fully repaid. Consistent with this analysis, we document that a firm’s financial leverage is negatively related to measures of employee morale, wages, and productivity.

後疫情時代的挑戰與機遇

網上流傳這樣一條選擇題:「疫情過後,誰在主導你公司業務的數碼轉型?」答案並非行政總裁或技術總監,而是2019冠狀病毒。這個答案雖聽上去頗具玩笑意味,但卻甚具現實意義。

後疫情時代的挑戰與機遇

網上流傳這樣一條選擇題:「疫情過後,誰在主導你公司業務的數碼轉型?」答案並非行政總裁或技術總監,而是2019冠狀病毒。這個答案雖聽上去頗具玩笑意味,但卻甚具現實意義。

後疫情時代的政策建議

迄今為止,2019冠狀病毒病(COVID-19)的疫情還遠未結束。儘管病毒仍在世界各地肆虐,香港仍需依賴嚴格的旅遊限制和檢疫措施來阻止病毒變種的流入,但我們建議政府,應提早研究後疫情時代的新常態,並根據研究制定相關政策,從而讓本港經濟得益。

後疫情時代的政策建議

迄今為止,2019冠狀病毒病(COVID-19)的疫情還遠未結束。儘管病毒仍在世界各地肆虐,香港仍需依賴嚴格的旅遊限制和檢疫措施來阻止病毒變種的流入,但我們建議政府,應提早研究後疫情時代的新常態,並根據研究制定相關政策,從而讓本港經濟得益。

經濟學的哥白尼式革命

被要求預測股票市場或宏觀經濟表現,是經濟學家經常遇到的「職業風險」。經濟學家對此往往無可奉告,皆因研究股市或宏觀經濟現象的學者為數甚少。所幸芝加哥大學經濟學教授利維特(Steve Levitt)在其暢銷名著《怪癖經濟學》(Freakonomics)中向大眾展示,經濟學家也會分析如警察數目和墮胎合法化對罪案率的影響、相撲手在賽事中作弊的誘因等,看似不屬於經濟學核心研究的問題。但有賴今年諾貝爾經濟學獎三位得獎者:加州大學伯克萊分校的卡德教授(David Card)、麻省理工學院的安格里斯特教授(Joshua Angrist)、史丹福大學的因本斯教授(Guido Imbens)的奠基工作和努力宣導,此等問題已經成為經濟學研究的主流之一。

經濟學的哥白尼式革命

被要求預測股票市場或宏觀經濟表現,是經濟學家經常遇到的「職業風險」。經濟學家對此往往無可奉告,皆因研究股市或宏觀經濟現象的學者為數甚少。所幸芝加哥大學經濟學教授利維特(Steve Levitt)在其暢銷名著《怪癖經濟學》(Freakonomics)中向大眾展示,經濟學家也會分析如警察數目和墮胎合法化對罪案率的影響、相撲手在賽事中作弊的誘因等,看似不屬於經濟學核心研究的問題。但有賴今年諾貝爾經濟學獎三位得獎者:加州大學伯克萊分校的卡德教授(David Card)、麻省理工學院的安格里斯特教授(Joshua Angrist)、史丹福大學的因本斯教授(Guido Imbens)的奠基工作和努力宣導,此等問題已經成為經濟學研究的主流之一。

疫市數碼轉型 HR責任擴大遇難題

新冠肺炎疫情驅動下,數碼時代變革加速。作為傳統行業的人力資源管理(HR),也正面臨着轉型升級的趨勢,無論是招聘渠道與面試方法、或是日常辦公以及培訓模式,均正逐步轉變。