Jin Li
Prof. Jin LI
经济学
管理及商业策略
Professor
Area Head of Management and Strategy

3917 0056

KK 936

Academic & Professional Qualification
  • PhD: MIT
  • Bachelor: Caltech (B.S) and Wesleyan University (B.A.)
Biography

Jin Li is a professor of management and strategy, with joint appointment in economics at Hong Kong University. Prior to HKU, he has taught at Kellogg School of Management and London School of Economics, where he was a tenured associate professor of managerial economics and strategy. During his tenure at LSE, Professor Li won the Management Department teaching prize.

Professor Li’s main research area lies at the intersection of organizational economics, personnel economics, and labor economics. It focuses on the dynamics of informal relationships and explores how firms can design organizations to align incentives and build trust. This research sheds light on how organizational design can be a source of competitive advantage. Recently, Professor Li has studied topics on the digital economy including causality issues in machine learning algorithms and governance of blockchain.

Professor Li has published in leading academic journals such as the American Economic Review, the Review of Economic Studies, AEJ- Microeconomics, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Labor Economics, and the RAND Journal of Economics. His works have also been featured in media outlets such as the BBC, the Economist, and Quartz, and he has written for Harvard Business Review, Caixin, and FTChinese.

Professor Li earned his BA in economics and math (with high honors) from Wesleyan University, a BSc in applied math (with honors) from Caltech, and PhD in Economics from MIT.

Teaching
  • Personnel Strategy for MBAs (Kellogg)
  • Strategy and Organization for MBAs (Kellogg)
  • Economics of Organization for PhDs (Kellogg)
  • Incentives and Governance in Organizations for Masters (LSE)
  • Capstone Project for MBAs (HKU)
Research Interest
  • Organizational Economics
  • Personnel Economics
  • Labor Economics
Selected Publications
  • Tacit Collusion in Auctions and Conditions for Its Facilitation and Prevention: Equilibrium Selection in Laboratory Experimental Markets,” (with Charles Plott), Economic Inquiry, Vol 47, No.3, (July 2009) pp. 425-448.
  • “Job Mobility, Wage Dispersion, and Technological Change: An Asymmetric Information Perspective,” European Economic Review Vol 60, (May, 2013) pp. 105-126.
  • “Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts,”
    (with Niko Matouschek), American Economic Review, Vol 103, No.6 (October, 2013) pp. 2328-51.
  • “Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations”
    (with Joyee Deb and Arijit Mukherjee), Rand Journal of Economics, Vol 47, No. 1 (Spring, 2016) pp. 3-28 (Lead Article).
  • “When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition?”
    (with Yuk-Fai Fong and Ke Liu), Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol 25, No.4 (Winter, 2016) pp. 852-879.
  • “Information Revelation in Relational Contracts”
    (with Yuk-Fai Fong), Review of Economic Studies, Vol 84 No. 1 (Jan 2017) pp. 277-299.
  • “A Theory of Turnover and Wage Dynamics,”
    (with Jun Yu), Economic Inquiry, Vol 55, No. 1 (Jan, 2017) pp. 223-236.
  • “Power Dynamics in Organizations,”
    (with Niko Matouschek and Mike Powell), AEJ Micro, Vol 9, No. 1 (Feb, 2017) pp. 217-241.
  • “Relational Contracts, Limited Liability, and Employment Dynamics”
    (with Yuk-Fai Fong), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 169 (May, 2017), pp. 270-293.
  • “Managing Careers in Organizations”
    (with Rongzhu Ke and Mike Powell), Journal of Labor Economics, Vol 36, No. 1 (Jan, 2018) pp. 197-252.
  • “Multilateral Interactions Improve Cooperation under Random Fluctuations”
    (with Michael Powell), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 119 (Jan, 2020) pp. 358-382.
  • “Negotiated Block Trade and Rebuilding of Trust”
    (with Pak Hung Au and Yuk‐Fai Fong), International Economic Review, Vol 61, No. 2 (May, 2020) pp. 901-939.
  • “Learning to Game the System”
    (with Arijit Mukherjee and Luis Vasconcelos), Review of Economic Studies, Vol 88, No. 4 (July, 2021) pp. 2014-2041.
  • “Morale and Debt Dynamics”
    (with Daniel Barron and Michał Zator), Management Science, Vol 68, No. 6 (June, 2022) pp. 4496-4516.
  • “Optimal Subjective Contracting with Revision”
    (with Xinhao He and Zhaoneng Yuan), Management Science, Vol 68, No.8 (August, 2022) pp.6346-6354.
  • “Corporate Capture of Blockchain Governance”
    (with Daniel Ferreira and Radoslawa Nikolowa), Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
  • “Career Spillovers in Internal Labor Markets”
    (with Nicola Bianchi, Giulia Bovini, Matteo Paradisi and Michael Powell), The Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
  • “Marketplace Scalability and Strategic Use of Platform Investment”
    (with Gary Pisano, Richard Xu and Feng Zhu), Management Science, forthcoming.
  • “What Makes Agility Fragile? A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Rigidity”
    (with Arijit Mukherjee and Luis Vasconcelos), Management Science, forthcoming.
Service to the University/Community

Professor Li has acted as a reviewer for 30 journals, including AER, Econometrica, JPE, QJE, and ReStud. He has also reviewed grant proposals for the National Science Foundation of the U.S. (NSF) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). Professor Li served as an external PhD examiner for the Norwegian School of Economics.

Recent Publications
经济护城河与企业盛衰

无论是投资者或是经营者,都希望自己参与的企业在市场竞争中立于不败之地。一间公司的内在价值,取决于其维持自由现金流的能力。能做到历久不衰、长期获利的企业,通常都具备可持续竞争优势(sustainable competitive advantage),也就是毕非德(Warren Buffett)口中的「经济护城河」(economic moat)。

经济护城河与企业盛衰

无论是投资者或是经营者,都希望自己参与的企业在市场竞争中立于不败之地。一间公司的内在价值,取决于其维持自由现金流的能力。能做到历久不衰、长期获利的企业,通常都具备可持续竞争优势(sustainable competitive advantage),也就是毕非德(Warren Buffett)口中的「经济护城河」(economic moat)。

椅子经济学:内卷、躺平和机会管理

今年哈佛大学的毕业典礼上,校长巴科(Lawrence Bacow)提到由于受疫情和供应链影响,校内折椅短缺,要不是员工足智多谋,可能一半毕业生得坐在地上。巴科以椅子作为比喻,目的是向毕业生提出希望和挑战。

椅子经济学:内卷、躺平和机会管理

今年哈佛大学的毕业典礼上,校长巴科(Lawrence Bacow)提到由于受疫情和供应链影响,校内折椅短缺,要不是员工足智多谋,可能一半毕业生得坐在地上。巴科以椅子作为比喻,目的是向毕业生提出希望和挑战。

员工士气与公司债务的动态

这项研究指出公司的债务会削弱员工相关奖励及损害士气。我们建立了一个动态模型,研究一名经理运用有限的财政资源,同时向债权人还款及激励员工士气。若该名经理可以转移或不正当地使用公司收入,公司的债务会减低员工达成既定奖励目标的意欲,导致其工作效率降低。在平均利润最大化的情况下,公司按优次偿还债务,使员工的工作效率及工资逐步提升。即使公司已完全还清债务,此动态仍会持续。此外,我们发现一间公司的财务杠杆与激励员工士气的措施、工资及生产力属反比关联,这与动态模型的分析相符。

后疫情时代的挑战与机遇

网上流传这样一条选择题:「疫情过后,谁在主导你公司业务的数码转型?」答案并非行政总裁或技术总监,而是2019冠状病毒。这个答案虽听上去颇具玩笑意味,但却甚具现实意义。

后疫情时代的挑战与机遇

网上流传这样一条选择题:「疫情过后,谁在主导你公司业务的数码转型?」答案并非行政总裁或技术总监,而是2019冠状病毒。这个答案虽听上去颇具玩笑意味,但却甚具现实意义。

后疫情时代的政策建议

迄今为止,2019冠状病毒病(COVID-19)的疫情还远未结束。尽管病毒仍在世界各地肆虐,香港仍需依赖严格的旅游限制和检疫措施来阻止病毒变种的流入,但我们建议政府,应提早研究后疫情时代的新常态,并根据研究制定相关政策,从而让本港经济得益。

后疫情时代的政策建议

迄今为止,2019冠状病毒病(COVID-19)的疫情还远未结束。尽管病毒仍在世界各地肆虐,香港仍需依赖严格的旅游限制和检疫措施来阻止病毒变种的流入,但我们建议政府,应提早研究后疫情时代的新常态,并根据研究制定相关政策,从而让本港经济得益。

经济学的哥白尼式革命

被要求预测股票市场或宏观经济表现,是经济学家经常遇到的「职业风险」。经济学家对此往往无可奉告,皆因研究股市或宏观经济现象的学者为数甚少。所幸芝加哥大学经济学教授利维特(Steve Levitt)在其畅销名着《怪癖经济学》(Freakonomics)中向大众展示,经济学家也会分析如警察数目和堕胎合法化对罪案率的影响、相扑手在赛事中作弊的诱因等,看似不属于经济学核心研究的问题。但有赖今年诺贝尔经济学奖三位得奖者:加州大学伯克莱分校的卡德教授(David Card)、麻省理工学院的安格里斯特教授(Joshua Angrist)、史丹福大学的因本斯教授(Guido Imbens)的奠基工作和努力宣导,此等问题已经成为经济学研究的主流之一。