The lack of hard evidence in allegations about sexual misconduct makes it difficult to separate true allegations from false ones. We provide a model in which victims and potential libelers face the same costs and benefits from making an allegation, but the tendency for perpetrators of sexual misconduct to engage in repeat offenses allows semiseparation to occur, which lends credibility to such allegations. Our model also explains why reports about sexual misconduct are often delayed, and why the public rationally assigns less credibility to these delayed reports.
February 2020
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
We study how vertical market structure affects the incentives of suppliers and customers to develop a new input that will enable the innovator to replace the incumbent supplier. In a vertical setting with an incumbent monopoly upstream supplier and two downstream firms, we show that vertical integration reduces the R&D incentives of the integrated parties, but increases that of the nonintegrated downstream rival. Strategic vertical integration may occur whereby the upstream incumbent integrates with a downstream firm to discourage or even preempt downstream disruptive R&D. Depending on the R&D costs, vertical integration may lower the social rate of innovation.
January 2020
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
An agent performing risky experimentation can benefit from suspending it to learn directly about the state. ‘Positive’ information acquisition seeks news that would confirm the state that favours experimentation. It is used as a last-ditch effort when the agent is pessimistic about the risky arm before abandoning it. ‘Negative’ information acquisition seeks news that would demonstrate that experimentation is futile. It is used as an insurance strategy to avoid wasteful experimentation when the agent is still optimistic. A higher reward from risky experimentation expands the region of beliefs that the agent optimally chooses information acquisition rather than experimentation.
January 2020
The Economic Journal
In an environment subject to random fluctuations, when does an increase in the breadth of activities in which individuals interact together help foster collaboration on each activity? We show that when players, on average, prefer to stick to a cooperative agreement rather than reneging by taking their privately optimal action, then such an agreement can be approximated as equilibrium play in a sufficiently broad relationship. This is in contrast to existing results showing that a cooperative agreement can be sustained only if players prefer to adhere to it in every state of the world. We consider applications to favor exchange, multimarket contact, and relational contracts.
January 2020
Games and Economic Behavior
专栏作者
Prof. Yi TANG
Dr. Tuan Quang PHAN
Prof. Vincent Peng ZHANG
Prof. Heiwai TANG
Prof. Shuqing LUO
Prof. Chun HUI
Prof. Jie GONG
Prof. Thomas Andreas MAURER
Prof. Bingjing LI
Prof. Fabrice LUMINEAU
Prof. Yi TANG
Associate Professor
学术论文
March 2023
January 2022
Dr. Tuan Quang PHAN
Chief Representative
学术论文
March 2023
Prof. Vincent Peng ZHANG
Assistant Professor
BSc (MAT) Deputy Programme Director and Admissions Tutor
学术论文
Mar 2023
Prof. Heiwai TANG
Associate Dean (External Relations)
Victor and William Fung Professor in Economics (冯国经冯国纶基金教授 (经济学))
Director, Asia Global Institute
Director, APEC Study Center
Associate Director, Hong Kong Institute of Economics and Business Strategy
Prof. Shuqing LUO
Associate Professor
Prof. Chun HUI
Professor
MGM Programme Director
学术论文
Prof. Jie GONG
Associate Professor
学术论文
Feb 2023
Prof. Thomas Andreas MAURER
Associate Professor
Prof. Bingjing LI
Associate Professor
学术论文
Jan 2023
Prof. Fabrice LUMINEAU
Professor