團隊

We investigate investors' voluntary disclosure decisions under uncertainty about their information endowment. In our model, an investor may receive initial evidence about a target firm. Conditional on learning the initial evidence, the investor may receive additional evidence that helps them interpret the initial evidence. The investor takes a position in the firm's stock, then voluntarily discloses some or all of their findings, and finally closes their position after the disclosure. We present two main findings. First, the investor will always disclose the initial evidence, even though the market is uncertain about whether the investor possesses such evidence. Second, the investor's disclosure strategy of the additional evidence increases stock price volatility: they disclose extreme news and withhold moderate news. Due to the withholding of the additional evidence, misleading disclosure arises as an equilibrium outcome, where the investor's report decreases (increases) price despite their news being good (bad). These results remain robust when considering the target firm's endogenous response to the investor's report.

Short selling regulation has been a longstanding topic of debate in financial markets, particularly during times of crisis. While proponents argue that short selling aids in price discovery and market efficiency, critics raise concerns about manipulative short selling practices that can destabilize markets. This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the impact of short selling, specifically manipulative short selling (MSS), on bank runs and efficiency. The model demonstrates that MSS can emerge as an equilibrium outcome driven by uninformed speculators seeking to profit from artificially depressing stock prices. The prevalence of MSS is influenced by the level of informed trading and coordination friction among creditors. We find that short selling bans can enhance welfare by mitigating the negative effects of MSS, particularly in scenarios with high coordination frictions. We also provide policy and empirical implications.

中國恒大(China Evergrande)的清盤人已對普華永道(PwC)提起訴訟，指控這家“四大”會計師事務所在為這家現已破產的房地產集團開展的工作中存在“疏忽”和“虛假陳述”。

We study the effects of mark-to-market accounting (MTM) for banks following the originate-to-distribute lending model. Banks have expertise in originating loans but it is costly for them to retain the loans on their books. We study how the accounting measurement of the retained loans affects the banks' origination and retention decisions. We show that, relative to historic cost accounting (HC), MTM has three consequences. First, it improves the accuracy of loan valuation ex post. Second, it forces banks to retain more risk exposure on their own books. Finally, it can reduce ex-ante origination efforts and lower the average quality of loans in the economy. To the extent that lower loan quality and banks' excessive risk exposure are two important ingredients for the recent financial crisis, we identify one mechanism through which MTM could contribute to financial crises.