團隊

3月10日，作為美國在創科領域最重要的銀行，矽谷銀行在48小時內突然宣布破產，無疑是近年來震撼全球的金融事件。雖然因為美國聯邦再保險公司快速介入和美國政府托底，避免了危機向其他金融機構和實體經濟大規模蔓延，但已反映出聯邦儲備局（聯儲局）自2022年以來多輪加息對金融和經濟帶來的巨大衝擊。

3月10日，作為美國在創科領域最重要的銀行，矽谷銀行在48小時內突然宣布破產，無疑是近年來震撼全球的金融事件。雖然因為美國聯邦再保險公司快速介入和美國政府托底，避免了危機向其他金融機構和實體經濟大規模蔓延，但已反映出聯邦儲備局（聯儲局）自2022年以來多輪加息對金融和經濟帶來的巨大衝擊。

A firm manager is concerned about both the firm value and the market assessments of his abilities. When investing in a project, he has private knowledge of his project-related ability that interacts with the project investment, and his general ability that produces a cash flow independent of the project cash flow. The concerns about the general (project-related) ability assessment create a signaling incentive to decrease (increase) investment. In the presence of underinvestment (overinvestment), higher-quality earnings information reduces (improves) equilibrium efficiency. When the manager issues an earnings forecast as an additional signaling device, the forecast is upwardly biased, and the equilibrium investment is smaller than that without a forecast. The latter is because the signaling incentive to decrease investment is strengthened. When the manager’s concerns about the general ability assessment are relatively large, he is better off by committing to no forecast. Novel empirical predictions about investment and earnings forecast emerge.