We examine the relationship between competition and reward practices in the public education sector. We hypothesize and find that school principals who face more intense competition make greater use of performance-based financial rewards and apply greater differentiation in its distribution between higher versus lower performing teachers. However, we do not find similar evidence for nonfinancial rewards. Further analyses suggest that financial rewards help attract and retain teachers in the face of competition. We also hypothesize and find that, as competition intensifies, principals direct incentives toward student outcomes that are easier to measure and communicate (student achievement) as well as their key determinant (teacher competence), relative to outcomes that are harder to measure and communicate (student well-being and engagement). Our findings suggest that school principals view financial incentives as effective for gaining a competitive edge and that competition can influence the relative importance they place on different student outcomes.
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- Ph.D., Accounting, The University of Melbourne
- M.Comm., Accounting, The University of Melbourne
- M.Mgt., Accounting, The University of Melbourne
- B.A., Journalism, Tsinghua University
Prof. Anson Jiang’s research lies at the intersection of accounting, environmental economics, and public policy, with a focus on the role of disclosure and transparency in environmental regulatory settings. He also studies management control systems using field data. Anson received his PhD and master’s degrees from The University of Melbourne and a BA from Tsinghua University. He is a licensed CPA in mainland China.
- Introduction to Financial Accounting (ACCT1101)
- Pollution Information
- Information-based Regulation
- Environmental Economics and Policy
- Management Control System
- “Competition and reward practices: Evidence from public schools”, with Sujay Nair. The Accounting Review, 100(5), (2025), 207-235.
- “Comply or explain: Do firms opportunistically claim trade secrets in mandatory environmental disclosure programs?”, Journal of Accounting Research, 62(5), (2024), 1755-1794. (Dissertation)
- “The interdependence between the choice of fixed-term professional workers and the control environment”, with Sujay Nair, Margaret Abernethy, and Anne Lillis. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 113, (2024), 101525.
- “Manager ‘growth mindset’ and resource management practices”, with Margaret Abernethy, Shannon Anderson, and Sujay Nair. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 91, (2021), 101200.
This paper studies whether firms opportunistically make proprietary claims in mandatory environmental disclosure programs with trade secret exemption rules. Examining the mandatory chemical disclosure program in the fracking industry, I find evidence of opportunistic withholding of information among operators that are less likely to have trade secrets. Specifically, I find that these operators claim fewer chemicals as trade secrets when the operating site is in close proximity to water quality monitors. This is only observed among publicly traded operators that face a higher cost of societal backlash when disclosing pollutant information. Further analyses suggest that these operators are concerned about external environmental monitoring, which deters them from opportunistic information withholding. Regarding public and private operators that are more likely to have trade secrets, I do not find strong evidence that their information withholding varies with the monitoring conditions.