团队

3月10日，作为美国在创科领域最重要的银行，矽谷银行在48小时内突然宣布破产，无疑是近年来震撼全球的金融事件。虽然因为美国联邦再保险公司快速介入和美国政府托底，避免了危机向其他金融机构和实体经济大规模蔓延，但已反映出联邦储备局（联储局）自2022年以来多轮加息对金融和经济带来的巨大冲击。

3月10日，作为美国在创科领域最重要的银行，矽谷银行在48小时内突然宣布破产，无疑是近年来震撼全球的金融事件。虽然因为美国联邦再保险公司快速介入和美国政府托底，避免了危机向其他金融机构和实体经济大规模蔓延，但已反映出联邦储备局（联储局）自2022年以来多轮加息对金融和经济带来的巨大冲击。

A firm manager is concerned about both the firm value and the market assessments of his abilities. When investing in a project, he has private knowledge of his project-related ability that interacts with the project investment, and his general ability that produces a cash flow independent of the project cash flow. The concerns about the general (project-related) ability assessment create a signaling incentive to decrease (increase) investment. In the presence of underinvestment (overinvestment), higher-quality earnings information reduces (improves) equilibrium efficiency. When the manager issues an earnings forecast as an additional signaling device, the forecast is upwardly biased, and the equilibrium investment is smaller than that without a forecast. The latter is because the signaling incentive to decrease investment is strengthened. When the manager’s concerns about the general ability assessment are relatively large, he is better off by committing to no forecast. Novel empirical predictions about investment and earnings forecast emerge.