團隊

確實，雖然大量資本正湧入AI領域，但其中相當一部分投資尚未帶來實質性或可見的商業回報。例如，Meta發佈財報披露其投入巨資佈局AI運算能力、數據中心和人才招募後股價應聲下跌，部分反映了投資者對於大量AI投資的疑慮。那麼，當下的AI投資是否已經顯得過於狂熱? 還是如許多支持者所言，「這一次是真的」（This time is real）?

Big data and data technology have facilitated the widespread adoption of personalized pricing practices. While price personalization enables firms to extract greater rent from consumers, it often reduces price transparency, which can negatively impact firm profits in situations involving consumer coordination. In such contexts, a firm's commitment to pricing strategies can become essential for restoring profitability. We explore several commitment devices available to firms and discuss their implications. These devices include delegating pricing decisions to a manager who prioritizes consumer surplus, leveraging existing networks as signals for later consumers or to build reputation, and implementing uniform pricing or price caps in response to regulatory restrictions.

人工智能技術高速發展，有機會被部分借款者用來美化其信貸資料以獲批貸款。貸款方與其透過多方面大量收集數據審批借款者，倒不如自我設限，集中提高收集數據的質量，同時增加貸款利潤。

We study voluntary cost disclosure by duopoly firms when they can invest in a cost-reduction technology, i.e., when their private cost is endogenously determined. We find that, contrary to most of the literature, firms disclose their endogenous cost information regardless of the type of competition. The underlying mechanisms and welfare implications, however, are different. Under Bertrand competition, cost disclosure helps a firm avoid aggressive investment in cost reduction to coordinate actions to the mutual advantage of the duopoly firms. Under Cournot competition, disclosing cost information enables a firm to show a hardened stance toward the competing firm. Although firms gain from their disclosure decisions under Bertrand competition, their disclosure decisions under Cournot competition place them in a prisoner’s dilemma, as both firms would be better off if they chose not to disclose their information. Consequently, consumers may lose under Bertrand competition but gain under Cournot competition.

We study information sharing between strategic investors who are informed about asset fundamentals. We demonstrate that a coarsely informed investor optimally chooses to share information if his counterparty investor is well informed. By doing so, the coarsely informed investor invites the other investor to trade against his information, thereby reducing his price impact. Paradoxically, the well informed investor loses from receiving information because of the resulting worsened market liquidity and the more aggressive trading by the coarsely informed investor. Our analysis sheds light on phenomena such as private communications among investors and public information sharing on social media.