團隊

中澳兩國之間的貿易矛盾越演越烈，有評論認為中國不應在與美國糾纏之際四面樹敵。但鑑於美國奉行「美國優先政策」，中方相信就算中澳貿易戰開打，美國絕對會袖手旁觀。故中國希望藉此揭露穿美國的虛偽，讓西方國家認識到為他人火中取栗的失策。

萊尼和妻子在家中受歹徒襲擊，妻子被姦殺，萊尼腦部受傷，康復後人生目標只有一個：找到兇手，為妻子報仇。無奈他患上短期失憶症，只能記得剛剛幾分鐘發生的事，其餘就忘得一乾二淨，又怎能追查兇手的線索？他住在某個汽車旅館，但記不起入住的來由；有些人在幫他，他卻不記得見過對方，也不敢完全信任他們。 這就是電影《凶心人》（Memento）的情節，內地譯名為《記憶碎片》，台灣則譯作《記憶拼圖》。電影發行於2000年，導演是後來聲名大噪的基斯杜化．路蘭，當時剛出道不久，已有不同凡響的表現。全片採用獨特的片段式倒敍手法，呈現劇情的來龍去脈──英雄孤軍作戰，最終克服困難，實現人生目標；聽來驟似老套，但其實別有深意。

We study the value of commitment in a business environment that is both competitive and uncertain, in which two firms face stochastic demands and compete in positioning and repositioning. If the future demand tends to disperse or the demand uncertainty is sufficiently large, one firm chooses rigidity (i.e., commits not to change its positions), and the other chooses flexibility (i.e., to reposition freely). We find that a firm’s rigidity can benefit not only itself, but also its flexible rival. When uncertainty is larger, rigidity becomes more valuable relative to flexibility. These results arise because the asymmetric equilibrium generates two collective gains in addition to the usual individual gain (in terms of competitive advantages) accrued to the committing firm. A firm’s rigid repositioning can soften competition and generate a commitment value, and the other firm’s flexible repositioning generates an option value. Both values then spill over to competitors within the ecosystem. These results suggest that, when firms compete under uncertainty, commitment and options are valuable not only for the party that is making the choice, but also for all competing parties collectively. Commitment value and option value do not have to be mutually exclusive; they can coexist and even strengthen each other through unilateral commitment, which achieves the best of both strategies.

新年伊始，兩家電力公司提高電費，引起公眾普遍關注。電力市場為什麼需要管制，以及價格管制的兩種基本模式有何利弊，筆者上周已在本欄論述。電力供應的穩定與安全至關重要，特區政府的能源政策又須兼顧環保，在未來幾年將大幅提升發電燃料中天然氣的比例，在此大前提之下，新的《管制計劃協議》繼續採用回報率機制，亦在情理之中。

We study how vertical market structure affects the incentives of suppliers and customers to develop a new input that will enable the innovator to replace the incumbent supplier. In a vertical setting with an incumbent monopoly upstream supplier and two downstream firms, we show that vertical integration reduces the R&D incentives of the integrated parties, but increases that of the nonintegrated downstream rival. Strategic vertical integration may occur whereby the upstream incumbent integrates with a downstream firm to discourage or even preempt downstream disruptive R&D. Depending on the R&D costs, vertical integration may lower the social rate of innovation.

踏入2020年元旦，市民即面對電費加價：中華電力有限公司加幅2.5%，香港電燈有限公司則加5.2%。去年年底兩家電力公司宣布新收費，立刻引起一片口誅筆伐。手機、汽車、豬肉、大米也會加價，但消費者常常淡然處之；即使房價貴得離譜，只升不跌，也沒有像電費這樣招來眾口一詞對賣方的批評。究其原因，是因為電力是一個受嚴格管制的行業，一分一毫的價格變動都要得到政府批准，不像其他大部分行業，價格主要受供給、需求、競爭的影響而自由浮動。即使是房屋，特區政府的干預也不過是間接通過徵收特別印花稅來調節，而不是直接設定交易價格。討論電費漲價合理與否，首先要理解為什麼電力行業需要管制，以及怎樣管制才屬有效。

The article 《為什麼要管制公共交通？》 was originally published in Hong Kong Economic Journal column 「龍虎山下」

Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long‐term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream after compensation of downstream firms.