Will Peichun WANG
Prof. Will Peichun WANG
管理及商业策略
Associate Professor

3917 5245

KK 1230

Academic & Professional Qualification
  • Ph.D., The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
  • B.S., Duke University
Biography

Professor Will Wang is an Associate Professor of Management and Strategy at HKU Business School, the University of Hong Kong. He specializes in the intersection of economics, technology, business strategy, and data science. His research explores how technology, marketplaces, and algorithmic tools influence firm behavior, pricing, and strategic decision-making.

Professor Wang’s work has been published in leading academic journals, including the American Economic Review and Marketing Science. In addition to his academic research, Professor Wang previously served as Chief Economist at Unity Technologies, where he advised on company strategy and the design of its ad network. Earlier in his career at Microsoft Research, he initiated and launched Azure Spot, the company’s first dynamic pricing product for its cloud services.

Professor Wang holds a Ph.D. from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and a B.S. in Mathematics and Economics from Duke University.

Research Interest
  • Economics of technology and digitization, market design, industrial organization, quantitative marketing
Selected Publications
  • “Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction,” (with Ulrich Doraszelski, Katja Seim, and Michael Sinkinson), American Economic Review, Vol. 115, No. 3 (March, 2025) pp. 903-944.
  • “Online Search and Product Rankings: A Double Index Approach,” (with Giovanni Compiani, Gregory Lewis, and Sida Peng), Marketing Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May-June, 2024) pp. 615-636.
  • “Unpolluted Decisions: Air Quality and Judicial Outcomes in China,” (with Yue Hou), Economics Letters, Vol. 194 (September, 2020), Article 109369.
Recent Publications
Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction

We explore the implications of ownership concentration for the recently concluded incentive auction that repurposed spectrum from broadcast TV to mobile broadband usage in the United States. We document significant multilicense ownership of TV stations. We show that in the reverse auction, in which TV stations bid to relinquish their licenses, multilicense owners have an incentive to withhold some TV stations to drive up prices for their remaining TV stations. Using a large-scale valuation and simulation exercise, we find that this strategic supply reduction increases payouts to TV stations by between 13.5 percent and 42.4 percent.