团队

Lenders are reluctant to finance firms' innovation activities because such activities tend to be opaque, with a high likelihood of negative outcomes that could hamper loan repayment. We posit that public credit registries (PCRs), which play an important role in credit information sharing in many countries, can facilitate financing by reducing adverse selection and moral hazard and increasing bank competition. Using the staggered establishment of PCRs in different countries and an international firm–patent data set, we find that credit information sharing positively affects firm innovation, especially in firms that experience a larger increase in bank debt financing after the establishment of a PCR. This finding is consistent with the notion that credit information sharing promotes firm innovation by easing bank debt financing frictions. We also find a stronger effect in countries that experience a large increase in bank competition after the establishment of a PCR—consistent with increased bank competition serving as a channel through which credit information sharing facilitates bank debt financing, thereby generating a positive effect on firm innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when the established PCR has features that promote credit information sharing. It is also more pronounced for opaque firms and firms in innovation-intensive industries, indicating that credit information sharing helps to reduce financing frictions. Finally, we posit and find evidence that firm efficiency in transforming innovation inputs into outputs improves after the establishment of a PCR. Overall, our paper offers novel insights into how credit information sharing facilitates firm innovation.

Insurers can boost their earnings by accruing interest income from their corporate bond investments. We document that insurers have higher corporate bond investments as well as less equity and cash holdings, when their parents meet or just beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts, compared to when their parents miss or comfortably beat the forecasts. The investment in corporate bonds to boost earnings is more pronounced when bond offerings provide more opportunities for accruing interest income, when the parent’s corporate governance is weaker, when the parent’s managers have more equity incentives, when insurers face more competition, when other earnings management techniques are used, or when the insurance segment is more important to the parent. Finally, insurers suspected of helping their parents meet or beat earnings benchmarks experience worse investment performance in subsequent years, presumably because, by investing more in corporate bonds, the insurers forgo investment opportunities with higher longer-term returns.

Credit information sharing allows creditors to obtain borrowers' relevant credit information, and it can improve borrowers' investment outcomes that are funded by debt. Using reforms to European countries' public credit registries (PCRs) to capture mandated information sharing among creditors, we examine the impact of such sharing on firms' investment efficiency. We find that information sharing enhances firms' investment efficiency, which we measure by their investment-q sensitivity. This finding is consistent with credit information sharing enabling creditors to better screen borrowers to mitigate adverse selection and enhancing borrower discipline to avoid a bad credit record, which leads to the borrower making more efficient investments. We also document that the information sharing effect is more pronounced when firms rely more on debt financing, when the shared credit information is more accessible, when firms' information environment is more opaque, and when there is a greater information monopoly in the banking system. We offer supplementary evidence that the effect is also more salient when PCRs have characteristics that suggest more effective credit information sharing. Overall, our paper offers new insight into whether and how information sharing in credit markets enhances firms' investment efficiency. More broadly, it highlights how making more borrower information available to creditors can have important economic spillover effects on firm outcomes.

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program was a natural experiment that imposed increases in tick size for randomly selected small-cap firms. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we examine the effect of this increase in tick size on earnings guidance. We find that after initiation of the program, treatment firms provide significantly less earnings guidance. We provide further evidence that this decrease is driven by increases in investors’ fundamental information acquisition and in firms’ financial reporting quality, consistent with firms reducing earnings guidance when investors are already more informed. The decrease is stronger for firms with higher proprietary costs of disclosure, consistent with firms being more likely to reduce costly disclosure when investors are more informed. In contrast, the decrease is weaker for firms with greater external financing needs, consistent with these firms continuing to seek the benefits of disclosure, even when investors are more informed. Taken together, our results suggest that an increase in tick size makes investors more informed, which, in turn, reduces the need for firms to provide earnings guidance, though the extent of the reduction depends on the costs and benefits of providing earnings guidance.

Credit default swaps (CDS) are a major financial innovation related to debt contracting. Because CDS markets facilitate bad news being incorporated into equity prices via cross-market information spillover, CDS availability may curb firms’ information hoarding. We find that CDS trading on a firm’s debt reduces the future stock price crash risk. This effect is stronger in active CDS markets, when the main lenders are CDS market dealers with securities trading subsidiaries, or when managers have more motivation to hoard information. Our findings suggest that debt market financial innovations curtail the negative equity market effects of firms withholding bad news.

International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 is of practical relevance to banks because it requires intense monitoring of borrowers to record timely loan losses. Using data from 50 countries, we find that accounting-driven bank monitoring due to IFRS 9 adoption reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt relative to public debt. This finding is consistent with firms experiencing more costly bank monitoring after a shift in regulatory reporting that requires banks to monitor borrowers more intensely. In further analyses, we find that the negative effect of IFRS 9 adoption on bank debt reliance is more pronounced with more stringent regulatory supervision of banks, consistent with regulatory stringency exacerbating costly bank monitoring for firms. We also find that the negative effect is stronger when firms can more easily switch from bank debt to public debt financing, consistent with the relevance of switching costs in firms’ decisions to avoid costly bank monitoring.

Customer referencing is a strategy that firms can use to disclose their connections with reputable customers as a means of enhancing their own reputations. We study the capital market benefits of naming reputable nonmajor customers in firms' financial reports to provide empirical evidence on whether this form of customer referencing has important practical implications. We predict and find that firms enjoy a lower cost of equity when they engage in customer referencing in their financial reports, consistent with the argument that this form of voluntary disclosure increases investor attention and customer certification. In cross-sectional analyses, we predict and find that the benefits of customer referencing are more pronounced for firms that (1) lack major customers or reputable major customers, (2) name customers whose reputations exceed their own, and (3) face higher competition. Overall, our study provides evidence that communicating certain interorganizational connections can generate capital market benefits for disclosing firms.