We show that installing stronger risk management into financial institutions—a proposal widely discussed following the 2008 financial crisis—is insufficient to constrain institutions’ exposure to investment with lurking risk, such as asset-backed securities (ABS). Regulations affect the functioning of risk management: risk management constrains institutions’ exposure to risky ABS when they face mark-to-market reporting combined with capital requirements; however, this role is considerably weaker when capital requirements are combined with historical cost accounting. We find suggestive evidence that financial regulations affect risk management functions through promoting risk managers’ efforts in uncovering ABS risk and curbing executives’ incentives to take excessive risk.
在美國納斯特交易所上市的中國最大連鎖咖啡店瑞幸咖啡，因在2019年第二至第四季度，虛報公司銷售額約22億元人民幣，以致股價在消息披露當天暴跌76%，市值損失了近48億美元。據悉，數家知名律師事務所（如Rosen Law Firm 和Federman & Sherwood）正為受損失的股東部署對瑞幸咖啡提起證券集體訴訟（Securities Class Actions）。那麼瑞幸的董事和高級管理人員將面臨什麼法律風險？
This paper examines the incentive effects of a mandatory personal deductible in liability insurance contracts for directors and officers (D&Os). Exploiting a novel German law that mandates personal deductibles for executives, we document positive returns for affected firms around the first announcement of the plan to impose a personal deductible. We also find evidence of long-run effects: affected firms decrease risk taking in operational activities and financial reporting, and improve the quality of takeover decisions. Our study shows that the structure of D&O insurance contracts matters because mandating that D&Os have “skin in the game” appears to lead to real effects on firm value.