团队

This paper studies how globalization affects the corporate tax policies of U.S. manufacturing firms. Using U.S.-granting China Permanent Normal Trade Relations as a quasi-natural experiment, we find a significant increase in tax reduction activities for firms facing higher exposure to Chinese imports. The effect is more pronounced for firms with higher managerial slack. We also find that the effect is stronger for firms in less diversified products market and faster changing industries. We also show that U.S. firms facing higher Chinese import competition are more likely to engage in other tax-motivated activities: acquisition of subsidiaries in low-tax regions and suspected transfer pricing. Furthermore, we explore the 2017 tax cut and the recent U.S.-China trade dispute and find that firms engage less in tax reduction activities after the 2017 tax cut and after the tariff increase for Chinese imports.

Does a bank’s dependence on different external funding sources shape its voluntary disclosure of information? We evaluate whether economic shocks that increase the supply of bank deposits alter the cost–benefit calculations of bank managers concerning voluntary information disclosure. We measure information disclosure using 10-K filings, 8-K filings, and earnings guidance. As for the funding shock, we use unanticipated technological innovations that triggered shale development and booms in bank deposits. Further analyses suggest that greater exposure to shale development reduced information disclosure by relaxing the incentives for managers to disclose information to attract funds from external capital markets.

Take the recent study by Chen Lin and Mingzhu Tai from the HKU Business School, conducted with collaborators from the University of California, Berkeley and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Their paper addressed a fundamental worry for almost everyone during the pandemic: Money. Specifically, they examined how people in the U.S. saved money in response to COVID-19.

The online trading platform Alibaba provides financial technology (FinTech) credit for millions of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). Using a novel data set of daily sales and an internal credit score threshold that governs the allocation of credit, we apply a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) to explore the causal effect of credit access on firm volatility. We find that credit access significantly reduces firm sales volatility and that the effect is stronger for firms with fewer alternative sources of financing. We further look at firm exit probability and find that firms with access to FinTech credit are less likely to go bankrupt or exit the business in the future. Additional channel tests reveal that firms with FinTech credit invest more in advertising and product/sector diversification, particularly during business downturns, which serves as effective mechanisms through which credit access reduces firm volatility. Overall, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the role of FinTech credit in MSMEs.

中国在不同县市实施的最低工资政策有所不同。此研究透过使用中国制造业企业的工业普查数据，探讨最低工资政策如何影响资本投资。利用最低工资政策在县市边界的不连续性，我们发现最低工资政策会增加资本投资。企业的劳动密集度越高，技术提升空间越大，以及企业无法将劳动成本转嫁予消费者时，其对于最低工资政策所作出的投资反应越大。研究中一项基于县市管辖权变化的自然实验进一步确定了最低工资与资本投资的因果关系。

我们透过分析舌蝇于前殖民地时期在不同地域的生存条件差异，来研究流行病对现代金融发展的影响。在非洲，舌蝇传播一种对人类有害且导致牲畜死亡的流行病。利用新的地理参考数据，我们发现历史上位于较容易受到流行病影响的地区的公司和家庭，现今获得外源融资的机会较小。通过探索这些渠道，我们发现历史上虫害成灾地区的居民较难信任他人和金融机构、共享资讯，以及学习和采用新的金融科技。

为什么在疫情期间会有大量存款汇入银行？我们发现，银行分行若位于2019冠状病毒病感染率较高的地区，它们的存款利率较位于感染率较低的地区的银行分行（即便是隶属同一家银行集团）为低。信贷提取、国家政策（如薪资保护计划）以及避险措施并非导致这些银行分行之间出现存款利率变化的原因。证据显示，2019冠状病毒病感染率较高的地区与当地民众对其就业前景和收入减少的焦虑有连带关系，导致民众减少支出和增加银行存款。

2021中关村论坛於9月24至28日在中国北京举办。中关村论坛乃国家级平台，致力促进全球高科技创新交流合作。香港大学经管学院副院长林晨教授获邀於 9月25日为金融科技平行论坛担任主旨演讲嘉宾，通过视频就《科技信贷市场发展的一些思考》作重点分享。

研究团队收集来自 61 个经济体，合共超过6700间公司的数据，评估企业特质与股票收益表现，以及新冠疫情个案之间的关联性。研究发现，尽管新冠疫情导致股票收益减少，但某些企业录得的跌幅较为轻微，而这些企业具有以下特质：在 2020 年前公司的财务状况较好（如拥有较多现金和未提取的信贷额、较少的总债务和短期债务，以及维持较高的利润水准）、全球供应链和客户地点受新冠疫情影响较小，积极推动企业社会责任的活动，以及较少地位稳固的高管人员。此外，家族企业（尤其是家族直接控股和雇佣职业经理人的家族企业）、大企业或政府控制的企业的股票回报表现较佳，而由对冲基金和其他资产管理公司大量投资的公司则表现逊色。在疫情期间，股票市场给予拥有较低管理层所有权的企业正面评价，却给予拥有较高管理层所有权的企业负面评价。