团队

团队研究公司的信息披露政策如何影响投资者从市场中获取专业知识，以及市场价格的信息含量。我们区分投资者的两种不同信息优势：从优越的渠道而获得的信息优势或因拥有卓越的信息处理能力而享有的信息优势。我们发现，与公开披露或非针对性选择性信息披露相比，针对向经验丰富的投资者的选择性信息披露能鼓励投资者获取更多专业知识，并提高价格的信息含量；当中，如经验丰富的机构投资者能以较低成本获得独家信息，便能实现专业知识价值最优使用。研究结果解释了为何美国证监会在通过《公平揭露规则》后，投资者与公司之间的非公开信息交流仍然存在，为监管机构释除公众对《公平揭露规则》日益增加的疑虑及执法安排提供启示。

We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better information about the target value than a rival and target shareholders. The informed bidder’s information is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed. We show that withholding information creates a winner’s curse, thereby serving as a preemption device that deters the rival’s participation. In turn, an endogenous dis- closure cost arises that induces the informed bidder to optimally withhold favorable information to minimize the acquisition price—breaking down the standard unraveling result, even if his information is always hard. Perhaps surprisingly, stronger competition from the uninformed bidder can reduce the target shareholders’ payoff and increase the payoff of the informed bidder while unambiguously improving social welfare. Moreover, “hardened” information can reduce the gains to trade, decreasing welfare but increasing shareholders’ payoff. Our results provide a cautionary note to promoting more competition and more disclosure.