Yuk-fai Fong
Prof. Yuk-fai FONG
經濟學
管理及商業策略
Associate Dean (Taught Postgraduate)
Professor

3917 0026

KK 1101

Academic & Professional Qualification
  • PhD: Boston University
  • Master: Chinese University of Hong Kong (MPhil)
  • Bachelor: Chinese University of Hong Kong (BSSc)
Biography

Professor Yuk-fai Fong is a Professor of Management and Strategy, with joint appointment in Economics. Prior to HKU, he has taught at Kellogg School of Management and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Professor Fong received his BSSc and MPhil in Economics from Chinese University of Hong Kong, and PhD in Economics from Boston University.

His research interests include Industrial Organization, Competition Policy, Dynamic Games, and Applied Microeconomic Theory. He serves as an Editor for B.E. Journals of Theoretical Economics. His research has appeared at leading international journals such as Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, International Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Industrial Economics, and Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. He has consulted for companies such as Shell Oil Company and Platinum Guild International, and is an academic affiliate with Compass LexEcon. Professor Fong won the HKUST Franklin Prize for Teaching Excellent (MBA Required Courses) in 2017, and was a finalist for the award in 2013, 2014, and 2016.

Teaching
  • HKU: EMBA Strategic Management, EMBA Managerial Economics, MBA Managerial Economics, MBA Python for Managers and Strategists, MEcon Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy; Undergrad Strategic Management
  • HKUST: EMBA Orientation Program, EMBA Homecoming Module, EMBA Managerial Microeconomics, Kellogg-HKUST EMBA Talk, MBA Opening Module, MBA Homecoming, MBA Managerial Microeconomics, ExecEd Value Creation, PhD Microeconomics, PhD Industrial Organization, MSc Topics in Industrial Organization, MSc Antirust Economics and Competition Policy
  • Kellogg: MBA Strategy and Organization
Research Interest

Industrial Organization, Competition Policy, Dynamic Games, Applied Microeconomic Theory

Selected Publications
  • “Trust Building in Credence Goods Markets”, (with Ting Liu and Xiaoxuan Meng), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2022, 14(1), 490-528.
  • “Negotiated Block Trade and Rebuilding of Trust”, (with Pak Hung Au and Jin Li), International Economic Review, May 2020, 61(2), 901-939.
  • “Using Customer Service to Build Clients’ Trust”, (with Xiaoxiao Hu, Ting Liu and Xiaoxuan Meng), The Journal of Industrial Economics, March 2020, 68 (1), 136-155.
  • “Liability and Reputation in Credence Goods Markets”, (with Ting Liu), Economics Letters, May 2018, 166, 35-39.
  • “Signaling by an Informed Service Provider”, (with Frances Xu Lee), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Winter 2017, 26 (4), 955-968.
  • “Relational Contracts, Limited Liability, and Employment Dynamics”, (with Jin Li), Journal of Economic Theory, May 2017, 169, 270-293.
  • “Information Revelation in Relational Contracts”, (with Jin Li), The Review of Economic Studies, January 2017, 84 (1), 277–299.
  • “When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition”, (with Jin Li and Ke Liu), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Winter 2016, 25(4), 852–879.
  • “On the Role of Verifiability and Commitment in Credence Goods Markets”, (with Ting Liu and Donald J. Wright), International Journal of Industrial Organization, November 2014, 37, 118-129.
  • “Long-lived Consumers, Intertemporal Bundling and Collusion”, (with Jim Dana), The Journal of Industrial Economics, December 2011, 59(4), 609–629.
  • “Product Quality, Reputation, and Market Structure”, (with Jim Dana), International Economic Review, November 2011, 52(4), 1059–1076.
  • “Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion”, (with Qihong Liu), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 20 (3), Fall 2011, 739–775.
  • “Bidding in a Possibly Common-Value Auction”, (with Daniel F. Garrett), Note, Games and Economic Behavior, 70 (2), November 2010, 494-501.
  • “Private Information of Nonpaternalistic Altruism: Exaggeration of Generosity and Reciprocal Behavior”, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances), 9(1), 2009, Article 1. (One of two finalists, 2008 Arrow Prize for Junior Economists)
  • “On the Optimal Degree of Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Side Payments”, (with Jay Surti), Games and Economic Behavior, September 2009, 67 (1), 277–291.
  • “Compensation for Quality Difference in a Search Model of Money”, (with Balázs Szentes), International Economic Review, 46 (3), August 2005, 957-971.
  • “When do Experts Cheat and Whom do They Target?”, RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (1), Spring 2005, 113-130.
  • “The Identification of Unobservable Independent and Spousal Leisure”, (with Junsen Zhang), Journal of Political Economy 109 (1), February 2001, 191-202.
Service to the University/Community
  • Editor, B.E. Journals of Theoretical Economics, 2012- (Associate Editor, 2006-2012)
  • Associate Editor, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009-January 2021
  • Associate Editor, Taiwan Economic Review, 2012-2014
  • Director, Center for Experimental Business Research, HKUST, 2013-2018
  • Nominator, China Economic Prize, for National Economic Foundation, China, 2016, 2017, 2018
  • Co-chair, 12th Workshop on Industrial Organization and Management Strategy, 2016
  • Chair, HKUST Workshop on Industrial Organization, 2017, 2018
  • Executive Committee Member, Hong Kong Economic Association, 2017-
  • Advisory Committee Member, Curriculum Development Council and Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority Committee on Economics (Senior Secondary), 2013 –2017.
  • Advisory Committee Member, Diploma of Secondary Education Economics Subject Committee in 2013-2015.
Recent Publications
提升女性領導地位

上星期二是國際婦女節,筆者想藉此分享有關女性領導的觀點,其中包括筆者早前接受本地電視台訪問有關職場女性地位的見解。

提升女性領導地位

上星期二是國際婦女節,筆者想藉此分享有關女性領導的觀點,其中包括筆者早前接受本地電視台訪問有關職場女性地位的見解。

在信任品市場建立信任

日常生活中很多專家的服務屬於信任品。我們從多個角度研究專家如何在信任品市場建立起顧客的信任。當消費者預期自身有嚴重問題的機會不高,並且專家服務用於解決較嚴重問題才具經濟效益的情況下,單次交易將不會成交。而在重覆交易的環境中,消費者會通過拒絕接受專家的建議來監察他的誠實程度。在專家追求利潤最大化的情況下,雖然利潤會隨著專家注重信譽的程度而增加,但是達不到理論上的最高水準,這與體驗品市場的情況形成鮮明對比。當專家非常在乎自己的信譽時,會出現顧客拒絕解決嚴重問題的情況。當專家不夠重視自己的信譽時,他們會過度治療顧客的問題。兩種情況都不是最理想。